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Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF)
Queen Elizabeth Class
Part 4
CVF Role
Strategic Defence Review (1998): "aircraft carriers have
wide utility, particularly for power projection and rapid deployment
operations.”
Defence Strategic Guidance (2005): "Carrier Strike is an
expeditionary Fast Jet capability …… able to operate in uncertain Access
Basing and Over flight conditions ……[to] deliver deep strike against
Time Sensitive Targeting in all environments with its secondary role
supporting the land component in Close Air Support and it will remain a
robust Air Defence capability”.
The Invincible-class of carriers were designed for Cold War
anti-submarine warfare operations, with an airgroup of mainly ASW
helicopters plus a limited air defence capability provided by a small
number of embarked Sea Harriers. This essentially defensive role is no
longer appropriate and the emphasis with the Future Aircraft Carrier
(CVF) is now on increased offensive air power and an ability to operate
a wider range of aircraft in a variety of roles.
The CVF mission statement has been officially defined:
"The CVF is to be a joint defence asset with the primary purpose of
providing the UK with an expeditionary offensive air capability that has
the flexibility to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the
widest possible range of roles."
It is expected that CVF will be tasked:
-
As an early coercive presence that can promote
conflict prevention through deterrence;
-
As a flexible and rapidly deployable offshore base
during expeditionary operations when airfields may be unavailable or
denied, or when facilities ashore are still being established;
and
-
Contributing to the support of peacekeeping forces,
and, when necessary, initiating offensive military
action.
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Lockheed JSF's fly over a Strike Carrier Task Group |
Criticism
Despite the importance of CVF, the high cost of the
project inevitably soon generated criticism and the tragic events of 11
September 2001 has sadly probably played a key role in saving it from
cancellation. The perceived success of the USN's carriers in the
Afghanistan War of late 2001, and the associated limitations of the much
smaller HMS Illustrious in the same action, greatly reinforced the
governments commitment to CVF.
On 22 November 2001 the Minister
for Defence Procurement, Lord Bach, said: "The future carriers are
very much a lynchpin of our planned defence capability and will greatly
enhance our ability to intervene decisively in the world's trouble
spots. The value of such large carriers is being underlined on a
daily basis by our American allies in operations over Afghanistan. That
demonstration of power, reach, and strategic mobility of carrier-borne
air power provides ample confirmation that our commitment to this
project is the right way to go." This conclusion was
undoubtedly further reinforced by the achievements of USN carriers
during the Gulf War II of March-April 2003, and the limitation of the
RN's flagship aircraft carrier (HMS Ark Royal) to her secondary LPH role
during the same conflict.
Nevertheless, like a previous RN carrier project (
CVA-01), CVF become a very high-profile
defence capital expenditure programme subject to much criticism, not
least from Army and Air Force sources "off the record". But perhaps
surprisingly to many people, with an initial procurement cost projected
to be in the region of £3.5 billion ($7 billion) for the two ships at
current prices, CVF was actually very far from being the most valuable,
e.g. the Joint Combat Aircraft Project will cost around £8bn to procure,
and the Typhoon Eurofighter fighter a massive £19.7 billion to procure.
However the UK Defence
Budget was under extreme pressure as the MOD had to meet the immediate
operational demands of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq , CVF was regarded by
many people as one of the
few "big ticket" items that could be easily cancelled in order to
relieve the pressure - partly because it was a national rather than
multi-national project.
Pressure on the project became intense and delays
in announcements increased speculation that the project was doomed, in
the amidst immense negative publicity it
was something of a surprise when the project got Main Gate 1 approval in
December 2005, and finally passed the critical Main Gate 2 milestone in July
2007 - nearly three years later than once hoped.
Key User Requirements
Nine top-level Key User Requirements (KURs) for CVF have been laid out,
which define the capabilities required. They are as follows:
-
KUR 1, Interoperability: CVF shall be able to
contribute to joint/combined operations;
-
KUR 2, Integration: CVF shall be able to integrate
with the joint battlespace to the extent required to support air
group operations, command, control, communications, computers and
intelligence (C4I) functions and survivability;
-
KUR 3, Availability: CVF shall be able to provide
one operational and available platform at all times;
-
KUR 4, Deployability: CVF shall be able to deploy
for operations worldwide;
-
KUR 5, Sustainability: CVF shall be able to sustain
operations;
-
KUR 6, Aircraft operation: CVF shall be able to
deploy offensive air power to the sortie-generation profile
specified without host-nation support;
-
KUR 7, Survivability: CVF shall be able to achieve a
high probability of survival;
-
KUR 8, Flexibility: CVF shall be able to operate the
largest possible range of aircraft; and
-
KUR 9, Versatility: CVF shall be able to operate in
the widest possible range of roles.
Each of these is supported in more detail by a
series of so-called user requirements documents (URDs), and there
are typically 10 of these per KUR.
A solution is developed which meets each of these
URDs but, almost invariably, the result is too expensive or too
difficult to achieve. It is the responsibility of the IPT, in
conjunction with the customer and the supply chain, to examine these
capability requirements and seek a solution that would measure
trade-offs, and meets the available budget. This is
necessarily an iterative and lengthy process, requiring both
analysis and synthesis of a complex set of variables.
A few examples of the cost - capability trade-off's faced have
entered the
pubic domain:
KUR 1, Inter-operability: This capability is
essentially the degree to which information can be generated,
gathered, supplied, and distributed through a variety of national
and multinational systems. Such a capability may require an enhanced
communication fit, radars, antennae, as well as complex distribution
systems and the ability to integrate complex messages that the
embarked staff can comprehend and issue the necessary commands. The
capabilities for trading are very wide including, for example,
intensive manpower that might be required to operate and maintain
the systems.
KUR 3, Availability: The CVF shall provide one
platform at high readiness for its principal roles at all times.
This one almost speaks for itself – but the trade-off considerations
include the life of the vessel, on-shore maintenance requirements,
hit reliability, system redundancy and readiness. It also, of
course, drove the need for two ships. The carriers have an
availability which is very similar to that of cruise ships – of
about 300 days per year.
KUR 6, Aircraft operations: The physical size of the
air wing, the volume of the hangar and the sortie generation rate –
that is, the total number of aircraft flights per day – are major
influences on the capability. Perhaps less well understood are the
demands of high sortie generation rates on weapon handling and
spaces for weapon preparation, prior to their delivery to the
aircraft. Considerable modelling has been undertaken to optimise the
ability to handle a large number of aircraft on the flight deck and
in the hangar, and deliver weapons to them. Such modelling has
inputs, for example, on the number and size of the aircraft lifts;
the arming and refuelling positions, as well as related matters of
provision of aircraft maintenance spaces, reading rooms, mission
planning and so on. The trade space is extensive.
KUR 8: Flexibility: This capability is virtually
guaranteed with a ship of this size, with its flexibility to be
reconfigured to operate different aircraft and to operate, for
example, a landing platform helicopter role, similar to HMS Ocean,
for humanitarian support. Consideration was also given to fitting
catapults and arresters, demanding space and power throughout the
ship, to fit future systems, representing a huge area of potential
trade-off.
Carrier Strike
CVF is actually only one part of the wider Carrier Strike requirement, four
main four components go together to bring this joint force capability:
- Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA), The
UK is part of US Joint Strike Fighter programme
- Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control
(MASC), Replacement for Sea King Airborne Surveillance and
Control. MASC will provide the air group with the
tactical support in achieving the specified mission and will also
deliver additional Situational Awareness to the Force.
- Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF), An expeditionary airbase for
strike operations
- Maritime Afloat Replenishment and Support
(MARS), Sea based support for CS, without MARS
supplying bombs, fuel and stores Carrier Strike loses any ability to
be expeditionary.
Carrier Strike will provide the UK with an expeditionary precision
strike capability able to operate without the need for Access, Basing
and Overflight facilities of any host nation. The graphic above
shows the top level view within the Architectural Framework (MODAF)
which is being used to support the design process, and shows many of the
Agencies and Organisations which CVF will need to interact with.
In December 2003 the MOD appointed a 'Senior Responsible Owner
for Carrier Strike', Rear Admiral Nigel Guild - who was also Controller of the
Navy and an Executive Director at the DPA . He was made personally
responsible for ensuring the Carrier Strike programme meets its objectives and
delivers the projected benefits. Admiral Nigel Guild considers himself to be
"answerable but not accountable" for the delivery of the overall capability. His main responsibilities
are to ensure that: the
overall programme is coherent and has the right characteristics for success; the
programme reflects departmental priorities and is worth pursuing; the
programme is subject to review at appropriate stages; oversight of the programme
business cases; monitoring and driving progress; problem resolution and
referral; benefits are delivered; and there is a post implementation review.
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