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Carrier Vessel for the Future (CVF)

Queen Elizabeth Class
 

Part 5

             Article Parts 

 1. Current Project Status and
     Graphics

  2. Specification

  3. The Project and its Origins

  4. Role

  5. Smart Procurement

  6. Project Schedule

  7. Procurement Process I
      (until Jan 2003)

  8. Procurement Process II  
      (until July 2007)

  9. Procurement Process III
      (latest situation)

10. Management and Industry
       Structures

11. Aviation Operations

12. STOVL or CV F-35?

13. Platform Design ...

14. ... and Redesign

15. C4ISR Facilities

16. Operational Concepts

17. Crew, Accommodation &
       Habitability

18. Propulsion and Engineering

19. Manufacture

20. Build Problems and UK
      Content

21. Basing and Support

22. Costs

23. Air Group

24. Aviation Requirements and
       Facilities

25. Catapults and Arresting Gear

26. Armament and Armour

27. Operations

28. Names

29. CVF Links



 

The "Smart" Procurement Process

The MOD's Defence Equipment and Logistics (DE&S) organisation (the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) until April 2007)  is responsible for the procurement of the future aircraft carriers (CVF) on behalf of the customer (the Royal Navy), and in 1999 it set up an CVF Integrated Project Team (IPT) to manage this. 

The CVF Project was one of the first large new projects to use the DPA’s “Smart Procurement Initiative” procurement methodology, and in its early years was described as its “flagship” by officials.

The Smart Procurement philosophy states that:

  • The MOD will engage the defence industry more fully in the process of devising and nurturing new acquisition projects. 

  • New relationships with industry will allow more flexibility in the choice of solution and technology.

  • Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) will be used which include MOD civilian and military acquisition staff, representatives of industry, the Service customer and those responsible for the support of the equipment through life.

  • More resources will be invested in the early stages of projects to refine planning, define whole-life costs (covering both acquisition and in-service support) and reduce risks before full programme commitment. 

  • At project approval, a quasi contract will be constituted between the DPA IPT and the MOD customer.

  • Rather than striving for maximum equipment performance at the outset there will be a greater inclination to opt for incremental acquisition.

  • By adopting the more flexible approach just described, the time needed for key new technologies to be introduced into front line service will be reduced. 

 

CADMID cycle

The so-called CADMID cycle is the structured approach to acquisition adopted for Smart Procurement.

This has six phases: concept; assessment; demonstration; manufacture; in-service, and disposal – all of different lengths, of course, with a two-stage approach to the formal approvals at the initial and remaining dates. CVF is currently (early 2007) in the third phase of the CADMID cycle, the demonstration phase, intended to ensure the design, build maturity, strategy, industrial capacity, costs and, importantly, the risks, are fully understood and accepted before the substantive manufacture and therefore costs are incurred.

In practice, in relation to the CVF Project the concepts of Smart Procurement have some times been badly over shadowed by politics, and practicalities such as cost constraints.  For example in the Concept Phase and early stages of the Assessment Phase the design was driven by the users Statement of Need and documented key requirements – with the suppliers being given considerable flexibility in deciding how these were to be best met.  It was only in mid-2003 - just a few months away from the then scheduled Main Gate review - that it became clear that the increasingly refined cost estimates being generated by the suppliers bore no relation to the available budget, and the subsequent painful retrenchment has had a major impact on the procurement process and schedule since then.

Actual procurement approach

 

Project Planning

The MOD and the Integrated Project Team IPT have made strenuous efforts to manage the CVF Project - which is part of the bigger Carrier Strike Programme - in accordance with modern best practice.  The difficulties in managing such a large programme with so many stakeholders and interdependencies cannot be underestimated - and that's before vested interests, politics and budget constraints come in to plays.  The following diagram is unfortunately hard to read here as a graphic, but does help to show the complexity event at the highest level:

Programme Plan for Carrier Strike (c.2016)

Thirteen different threads are shown, with  the overall Carrier Strike Programme at the top, information at the bottom

The almost top row (with the brown fill) shows JCA Programme and Equipment, assuming orders approved in early 2008 and delivery's starting from 2011/12. 

The row below shows a CVF milestone in late 2006 (missed) and the CVF's under construction (black bars) from mid-2008, with deliveries in mid-2012 and early 2015.

MASC is the next row down, with entry in to service in 2016 an initial operational capability in 2018

The key on the right first lists 14 organisations involved (CVF Integrated Project Team at the  top, DOC at the bottom) and then 12 stakeholders (Senior Responsible Officer at the top, Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy) at the bottom)

A major problem for the CVF project is that it was originally intended to be synchronised with associated projects such as JCA, MASC and MARS.  Unfortunately the linkages soon broke down (usually due to funding problems) and in fact each of these programmes is now at a different stage of the procurement cycle, which has apparently added enormously to the complexity of designing and building CVF.

 

 

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 © 2004-8 Richard Beedall unless otherwise indicated.