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Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF)

Queen Elizabeth Class
 

Part 16

             Article Parts 

 1. Current Project Status and
     Graphics

  2. Specification

  3. The Project and its Origins

  4. Role

  5. Smart Procurement

  6. Project Schedule

  7. Procurement Process I
      (until Jan 2003)

  8. Procurement Process II  
      (until July 2007)

  9. Procurement Process III
      (latest situation)

10. Management and Industry
       Structures

11. Aviation Operations

12. STOVL or CV F-35?

13. Platform Design ...

14. ... and Redesign

15. C4ISR Facilities

16. Operational Concepts

17. Crew, Accommodation &
       Habitability

18. Propulsion and Engineering

19. Manufacture

20. Build Problems and UK
      Content

21. Basing and Support

22. Costs

23. Air Group

24. Aviation Requirements and
       Facilities

25. Catapults and Arresting Gear

26. Armament and Armour

27. Operations

28. Names

29. CVF Links



 

Operational Concept

The April 2005 edition of Navy News revealed in an article "Carrier Strike Role brought back in to Focus" the first official indication of the operational concepts that the Royal Navy and MOD are developing for CVF.  The following paragraphs are largely derived from that article: 

The ship can be sent wherever required, maintaining independence without the need for a ‘host’ nation or diplomatic negotiation. The threat provided by big carriers, first unleashed in the era of conventional international wars, is still of value in times of asymmetric warfare and maverick terrorist groups, as a carrier-led task group allows the Royal Navy to pursue policies of countering terrorism and the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

The ability to deploy a big carrier with a clutch of fast jets also gives the Royal Navy a seat at the planning table for any future American-led coalition operations, rather than a passive presence.  But in order to maximise the potential of the big carriers, the Navy will have to face up to something of a conundrum.  Planners will have to think in a much wider context, as few missions would be purely maritime affairs – the emphasis would be on ‘power projection’, or taking the firepower to the opponent’s own backyard, which would invariably involve ground forces.  Yet they will have to work within a much narrower focus, specifically on the strike role.

The introduction of the new carriers also throws up a number of hurdles.  One is the shape of the strike group command. The carriers will never operate on their own – they will always be accompanied by a tailored group, including escort and supply train.  If, as is generally accepted, a commodore is needed to head the group, questions arise over his or her jurisdiction over the air group.  Naval strategists are believed to be close to a solution, which is likely to involve a ‘fixed-wing commander’ who will liaise between the strike group commander and the ‘owner’ of the air group in the role of Commander Air Group.

There is also likely to be a dedicated helicopter co-ordinator, freeing the current Commander Air (in charge of flying operations on the Invincible-class carriers) to concentrate on flight safety issues and traffic management.

Many of the new systems and procedures needed to create the carrier strike groups are already planned or being put into effect.  The Joint Force Harrier, which will produce four squadrons of GR9s (two RN and two RAF) is already in development with the move of Fleet Air Arm personnel from Yeovilton to RAF stations Cottesmore and Wittering.  Operational Sea Training and Joint Maritime Courses (JMCs) will start to focus on the primary carrier role.

Further training will be put to good use in the coming years, both in home waters and worldwide – the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Africa, the Far East and the United States.

The American aspect is crucial, according to Capt David James, the Fleet’s current and future carrier expert, who said: “We need to get our carriers working with American carriers and our air groups working with American air groups.”  The French are another potential training ally through work with their nuclear aircraft carrier FS Charles de Gaulle

Planners are eager to examine problems associated with ‘sortie generation’ (getting packages of aircraft aloft) – the main drawbacks are expected to be the supply of air weapons (the physical space required is simply not available) and the planning of combined sorties (fighter aircraft cover for bomber plane operations, for example).

Mission decision support is another area of interest – an air intelligence office will be of crucial importance, able to analyse images taken from the air and feed the results back into the planning process for the next wave of sorties.

The pendulum is now swinging so strongly in favour of redeveloping the maritime strike concept that the Navy is planning future training deployments around the needs of the air group – “if there is little to be gained, then there will be no point sending the air group and probably no point sending the carrier either,” said Capt James.  Similarly, if a group of maintainers from a squadron is not needed, then they will not sail with the ship.  Other tasks will be found for them back at their home base, and if the need arises, a flight can be arranged at short notice for the required personnel to join the ship at sea.

CVF Mission System (Source: BAE Systems)

 

Experimental CVF Battle space command & control organisation

 

Amphibious Capabilities

There is a stated requirement that the CVF's should be capable of a secondary role as a Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH), thus offering an alternative LPH capability when HMS Ocean or her eventual replacement is not a available - as the Invincible class CVS's currently do.  The down sizing of the CVF design has made this capability more difficult to fit in, and it is not expected to be fully defined and determined until 2005/6. 
 

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 © 2004-8 Richard Beedall unless otherwise indicated.