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Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF)

Queen Elizabeth Class
 

Part 20

             Article Parts 

 1. Current Project Status and
     Graphics

  2. Specification

  3. The Project and its Origins

  4. Role

  5. Smart Procurement

  6. Project Schedule

  7. Procurement Process I
      (until Jan 2003)

  8. Procurement Process II  
      (until July 2007)

  9. Procurement Process III
      (latest situation)

10. Management and Industry
       Structures

11. Aviation Operations

12. STOVL or CV F-35?

13. Platform Design ...

14. ... and Redesign

15. C4ISR Facilities

16. Operational Concepts

17. Crew, Accommodation &
       Habitability

18. Propulsion and Engineering

19. Manufacture

20. Build Problems and UK
      Content

21. Basing and Support

22. Costs

23. Air Group

24. Aviation Requirements and
       Facilities

25. Catapults and Arresting Gear

26. Armament and Armour

27. Operations

28. Names

29. CVF Links



 

 

Potential Build and Cost Problems

It should be pointed that doubts have been expressed about the modular approach being adopted for the construction of the new carriers.  Alf Young wrote in the Sunday Herald of 5 May 2002:

"... these 50,000 tonne monsters, each built at various yards around the UK coast in a series of 80% or 90% outfitted modules, each one bigger than a whole frigate, will be barged up the Clyde [now the Forth] and joined together ...

There's plenty of historic experience on the Clyde of building ships in bits and then sticking the bits together somewhere else. ...  It hasn't always been a happy experience.  In the early 1980s the nationalised Scott Lithgow tried to build a semi-submersible oil rig, the Iolair, by contracting out large sections of the twin hulls as far away as Barrow.  The technical difficulties that arose when the time came to put all the bits together were such that Iolair turned into a massive loss-making venture and helped tip Scott-Lithgow out of business.

The plans to build the Navy's two future carriers in this way is certainly bold. Whether it is also foolish, remains to be seen ...  it's a Lego-style solution.  Even experienced industry insiders are deeply sceptical. I know personally one former director of a UK defence contractor who cannot believe the concept is being given MoD houseroom and a member of Wendy Alexander's Clyde Shipyards Task Force who sought reassurance that the approach is credible in engineering terms but was far from convinced by the answers he received.

I hope we doubters are proved wrong. ...  But given the history of shipbuilding ... and the novelty of the construction techniques being proposed, I don't expect it to be a trouble-free experience."

A 2002 consultancy report by RAND for the MOD, "The Royal Navy's New-Generation Type-45 Destroyer: Acquisition Options and Implications" also highlighted how the 'hook-up' of the blocks will be a far greater challenge with the Future Carrier than with the much smaller Type 45 destroyer.

And in 2003 the respected Professor Keith Hartley of the University of York in his paper "Naval Shipbuilding in the UK and Europe: A Case for Industrial Consolidation?" said

Final confirmation of the ‘economics of the mad house’ would be seen in the UK decision to split the work on its new aircraft carriers into modules to be built at four different yards in Portsmouth, the North East and Scotland.

 ... the recent UK competition between BAE Systems and Thales for two new aircraft carriers resulted in the Ministry of Defence using its buying power to select the Thales design but appointing BAE as prime contractor with Thales as a key supplier. Our man from Mars would be even more mystified by the allocation of work on the two new carriers. Rather than building the carrier at one location, the work is being shared in modules to be built at four different yards. This maintains competition and capacity but sacrifices the learning economies from building the modules at one location. The allocation of work on the carrier becomes more fascinating when it is realised that the UKs largest warship yard and the one with recent experience of building a carrier (HMS Ocean), namely, the Barrow yard is not involved in the new carrier programme. Instead, Swan Hunter which lost the contract for HMS Ocean to Barrow and which almost exited the industry, will receive some of the work on the new carriers. Governments using their buying power move in strange ways with their choices often reflecting political rather than commercial criteria."

The French, now increasingly associated with CVF project, have also expressed concerns about the UK's modular superblock construction approach:  “They want to build their ships on [small] sites ..... Thus, Govan will manufacture aircraft carrier blocks on an inclined slipway! ” one French engineer exclaimed in 2006, perhaps forgetting that slips were have been used for warship construction for centuries.

 

Anglo-French Common Carrier

A consortium consisting of Thales Naval France and Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN) will build the French Navy's second aircraft carrier (PA2). 

Plans revealed during 2004 indicated that the hull of national Romeo (later Juliete) design would probably be built by the Alstom (now Akers) Chantiers de l'Atlantique shipyard at Saint Nazaire, and fitted out  by DCN at its Brest shipyard.  Chantiers de l'Atlantique is able to build much larger ships than a CVF, e.g. in 2003 they completed the 345m long Queen Mary 2 - just two years after first steel was cut!   Thus a "whole ship" rather than superblock construction technique could be adopted,  which is cheaper, less risky and almost certainly quicker than the superblock method for a small number of large ships.

In June 2005 the possibility of collaboration with the French on a common aircraft carrier project publicly re-remerged, with press reports suggesting that about one third of each ship could be fabricated in French ships yards.  In December 2005 it was announced that France would indeed utilise an adapted variant of the CVF design for its second aircraft carrier, but construction will be separate from the UK

France is now (June 2006) undecided as to how and where it will actually build and fit-out its new carrier, but is concerned that manufacturing decisions already made by the UK have limited scope for co-operation and costs savings.   A desire to reduce costs to an affordable level is leading the MOPA2 and DGA  to consider building blocks in an Eastern European (probably Polish) shipyard.  They are also looking at the option of building the French CVF in the UK as part of a three-ship production line - but there are serious French doubts about the cost base of UK shipyards; their size, facilities, capacity and capabilities; and continuing deep concerns about the risks associated with the UK's proposed superblock approach.

It's expected that PA2 will be ordered in the second half of 2007, construction work will start in 2009, sea trials commence in 2013, and the ship will enter service by early 2015.  The French rightly consider this to be a very aggressive timescale.

 

UK Content

Thales Naval promised that if it won the CVF order, the design, shipbuilding, outfitting and part of the ships equipment would remain in Britain, valuing these contracts at around 50% of the total. The rest of the contracts, covering systems from combat management to radars, were expected to go overseas.  Given the high foreign participation in the winning BAE Systems team (Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin and Alenia Marconi) it seems unlikely that BAE would have been able to deliver much greater UK content than Thales was offering - and notably when towards the end of Assessment Phase BAE Systems tried to wrap itself in the Union Jack, it failed to seize the opportunity to claim a higher UK content for its bid than Thales   The combined Aircraft Carrier Alliance and the Aircraft Carrier Team have also so far failed to give any indication of likely UK content.

 

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 © 2004-8 Richard Beedall unless otherwise indicated.