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Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF)

Queen Elizabeth Class
 

Part 26

             Article Parts 

 1. Current Project Status and
     Graphics

  2. Specification

  3. The Project and its Origins

  4. Role

  5. Smart Procurement

  6. Project Schedule

  7. Procurement Process I
      (until Jan 2003)

  8. Procurement Process II  
      (until July 2007)

  9. Procurement Process III
      (latest situation)

10. Management and Industry
       Structures

11. Aviation Operations

12. STOVL or CV F-35?

13. Platform Design ...

14. ... and Redesign

15. C4ISR Facilities

16. Operational Concepts

17. Crew, Accommodation &
       Habitability

18. Propulsion and Engineering

19. Manufacture

20. Build Problems and UK
      Content

21. Basing and Support

22. Costs

23. Air Group

24. Aviation Requirements and
       Facilities

25. Catapults and Arresting Gear

26. Armament and Armour

27. Operations

28. Names

29. CVF Links



 

Armament

Little indication has been given as to how the CVF's will be armed - other than aircraft. Some graphics of CVF concepts have been notable for their lack of visible armament.

At one point, the MOD asked BAE Systems to investigate the cost and impact of fitting CVF with the PAAMS air defence missile system, and some early BAE graphics of its CVF concept showed radars and VLS silo's for the Eurosam SAAM or PAAMS air defence missile system with Aster missiles, but this idea was dropped by 2002 on cost grounds. 

DS30B
MSI DS30B cannon

Some CVF Alliance graphics issued in 2003 showed a comprehensive set of short-range hard and soft-kill systems, including  including MSI DS30B 30mm Oerlikon cannon, Raytheon RAM PDMS, Raytheon Phalanx CIWS, SIRIUS and Vampir infra-red surveillance and tracking sensor sensors, and Super Barricade decoy launchers.  These were probably intended to be indicative of the options available, rather than any firm selection.  The Raytheon SEA RAM point defence missile defence system which combines the RAM missile with the search-and-track sensor systems of the Phalanx Block 1B CIWS has also been shown.  Typically four CIWS or PDMS mounts are shown fitted - one on roughly each quarter.

In late 2003 a cost cutting design review included the deletion of all hard kill weapon systems and a reliance on soft-kill defences alone (while retaining 'fitted for but not with' provisions for close-in weapons).  One MOD is quoted as saying “The reality is that these ships will never leave port without being in a taskforce, including submarines and destroyers to protect them.”

The graphics first published in 2004 showed three Phalanx CIWS mounts for final defence against aircraft and missiles, and four MSI DS30B 30mm light calibre cannons for self defence against small surface targets in littoral waters, anchorages and harbours.  Some of the locations seemed to be rather exposed (the portside forward sponsons) or less than ideal (the stern Phalanx mount).

Graphics since 2004 have continued to regularly show what appear to be Phalanx and MSI 30mm cannon mounts - although the locations have been tweaked to give better firing arcs.

Image of the CVF generated using QinetiQ's modelling tool SURVIVE. (Source: QinetiQ)

 

Survivability and Armour

Unlike all British carriers prior to the Invincible-class, no significant amount of armour - be it hardened steel, composite or ceramic - is likely to be included in the CVF design, although details are classified.

As key assets the CVF's will be heavily guarded by escorting ships such as the Type 45 destroyer, but if all other measures fail they must be able to protect themselves from any "residual threats" that penetrate the defences of their escorts.  During 2001 threat and vulnerability studies were undertaken by the Centre for Defence Analysis (CDA) for CVF, these studies took in to account big changes in the nature of the threat since the 20,000 tonnes Invincible-class were designed in the early 1970's, back then it was considered almost pointless trying to provided structural defence against the type of Soviet heavyweight torpedoes' and missiles likely to be encountered in the North Atlantic, if the ship stayed afloat after a hit, that was the best that could be expected.  Nowadays the threats are far more diverse, as well as "traditional" anti-ship missiles and torpedoes launched from aircraft, patrol boats, submarines or surface ships, the RN has become very aware of new threats in littorals and confined waters such as suicide speed boats.  The much larger CVF's will have to be able to cope with scenarios never considered for the Invincible class, for example it would be extremely embarrassing (at the very least) if a small craft approached a CVF in harbour and was able to disable her with just a hail of RPG's and light cannon fire.

In 2002 QinetiQ were awarded a contract by the MOD to study the vulnerability of the competing BAE and Thales design concepts to damage from a wide variety of mechanisms that could be inflicted by an above water or underwater attack.  QinetiQ also studied the possibility that an explosion in one weapons magazine might trigger a similar explosion in another magazine.    

Since the down-select in January 2003, QinetiQ have continued to assist the ACA at stages in the platform design process.   They use their Survive rapid vulnerability assessment tool develop an appropriate computer model of CVF and determine how vulnerable the design is, why it was vulnerable and what can be done to make it less vulnerable.  Survive simulates a multitude of primary and secondary damage mechanisms including: blast, fragmentation, shock, whipping, residual strength, flooding, fire and smoke and crew movement.  QinetiQ have helped optimise the armour levels without compromising protection - in some areas suggestions were that armour levels were increased and in others that they were reduced.  They also considered the number of casualties that might occur as the result of a weapon strike.

Based upon the results of the threat studies, side armour and blast resistant bulkheads were incorporated in to the 2002/3 Thales CVF Alpha design in order to protect important compartments such as the Operations Room, resulting in a very tough ship.  However as part of the cost cutting trade-off's made during the second half of 2003, many of these protective measures apparently had to be deleted. 

In the CVF Delta design concept adopted in December 2003,  considerable emphasis was instead placed upon including military standard damage control facilities, extensive internal subdivision and bulkheads, and providing the infrastructure for a high quality NBCD organisation.  It now seems that the primary protection of critical spaces such as magazines, steering gear, and ops rooms will be the location of these compartments deep in the ship.  But it remains possible that some such spaces will quietly receive some physical protection such as Kevlar for splinter protection.  The inclusion, or not, of such passive protection during the design and manufacture is likely to be classified, in accordance with recent practice.  In April 2007 the CVF IPT Team Leader, Rear Admiral Bob Love, stated "Specific Naval and Defence Standards have also been retained in other areas where a commercial equivalent is not appropriate such as the magazines.  Remember that the size of the vessel alone does give a degree of protection and this has allowed us to make pragmatic adjustments to the design."

The CVF design is not "stealthy", but considerable effort is being made to reduce signatures (radar, heat, acoustic)  to a degree that allows the effective use of passive soft kill countermeasures and off board decoys.  When "clean", a 280m long 65,000 tonnes displacement CVF carrier will have a radar return similar to a 38m 300 tonnes trawler. 

 

 

 

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 © 2004-8 Richard Beedall unless otherwise indicated.