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Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF)
Queen Elizabeth Class
Part 26

Armament
Little indication has been given as to how the CVF's will be armed - other
than aircraft. Some graphics of CVF concepts have been notable
for their lack of visible armament.
At one point, the MOD asked BAE Systems to investigate the cost and
impact of fitting CVF with the PAAMS air defence missile system, and some early BAE graphics of its CVF concept showed radars
and VLS silo's for the Eurosam SAAM or PAAMS air defence missile system
with Aster missiles, but this idea was dropped by 2002 on cost
grounds.
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MSI DS30B cannon |
Some CVF Alliance graphics issued in 2003 showed a
comprehensive set of short-range hard and soft-kill systems, including including MSI DS30B 30mm Oerlikon cannon, Raytheon RAM PDMS, Raytheon Phalanx CIWS, SIRIUS and Vampir
infra-red surveillance and tracking sensor sensors, and Super Barricade
decoy launchers. These were probably intended to be
indicative of the options available, rather than any
firm selection. The Raytheon SEA RAM point defence
missile defence system which combines the RAM missile with the
search-and-track sensor systems of the Phalanx Block 1B CIWS has also
been shown. Typically four CIWS or PDMS mounts are shown fitted - one on roughly each
quarter.
In late 2003 a cost cutting design review
included
the deletion of all hard kill weapon systems and a reliance on soft-kill
defences alone (while retaining 'fitted for but not with'
provisions for close-in weapons). One MOD is quoted
as saying “The reality is that these ships will never leave port
without being in a taskforce, including submarines and destroyers to
protect them.”
The graphics first published in 2004 showed
three Phalanx CIWS mounts for final defence against aircraft and
missiles, and four
MSI DS30B 30mm light calibre cannons for self defence against small
surface targets in littoral waters, anchorages and harbours.
Some of the locations seemed to be rather exposed (the portside forward sponsons) or less than ideal (the stern Phalanx mount).
Graphics since 2004 have continued to regularly show
what appear to be Phalanx and MSI 30mm cannon mounts - although the
locations have been tweaked to give better firing arcs.

Image of
the CVF generated using QinetiQ's modelling tool SURVIVE. (Source:
QinetiQ)
Survivability and Armour
Unlike all British carriers prior to the Invincible-class, no
significant amount of armour
- be it hardened steel, composite or ceramic -
is likely to be included in the
CVF design, although details are classified.
As key assets the CVF's will be heavily guarded by
escorting ships such as the
Type 45 destroyer, but if all other measures
fail they must be able to protect themselves from any "residual
threats" that penetrate the defences of their escorts. During 2001
threat and vulnerability studies were undertaken by the Centre for
Defence Analysis (CDA) for CVF, these studies took in to account big
changes in the nature of the threat since the 20,000 tonnes Invincible-class
were designed in the early 1970's, back then it was considered almost
pointless trying to provided structural defence against the type of
Soviet heavyweight torpedoes' and missiles likely to be encountered in
the North Atlantic, if the ship stayed afloat after a hit, that was the
best that could be expected. Nowadays the threats are far more
diverse, as well as "traditional" anti-ship missiles and torpedoes launched from
aircraft, patrol boats, submarines or surface ships, the RN has become
very aware of new threats in littorals and confined waters such as
suicide speed boats. The much
larger CVF's will have to be able to cope with scenarios never
considered for the Invincible class, for example it would be extremely
embarrassing (at the very least) if a small craft approached a CVF in
harbour and was able to disable her with just a hail of RPG's and
light cannon fire.
In 2002 QinetiQ were awarded a contract by the MOD to
study the vulnerability of the competing BAE and Thales design concepts
to damage from a wide variety of mechanisms that could be inflicted by
an above water or underwater attack.
QinetiQ
also studied the possibility that an explosion in one weapons
magazine might trigger a similar explosion in another magazine.
Since the down-select in January 2003, QinetiQ have continued to assist
the ACA at stages in the platform design process. They use
their Survive
rapid vulnerability assessment
tool
develop an appropriate computer model of CVF and
determine how vulnerable the design is, why it was vulnerable and
what can be done to make it less vulnerable.
Survive simulates a multitude of primary and secondary damage mechanisms
including: blast, fragmentation, shock, whipping, residual strength,
flooding, fire and smoke and crew movement. QinetiQ have helped
optimise the armour levels without compromising protection - in some
areas suggestions were that armour levels were increased and in others
that they were reduced. They also considered the number of
casualties that might occur as the result of a weapon strike.
Based upon the results of the threat studies, side armour and blast
resistant bulkheads were incorporated in to the 2002/3 Thales CVF Alpha
design in order to protect important compartments such as the Operations
Room, resulting in a very tough ship. However as part of the cost
cutting trade-off's made during the second half of 2003, many of these
protective measures apparently had to be deleted.
In the CVF Delta design concept adopted in December 2003,
considerable emphasis was instead placed upon including military standard damage
control facilities, extensive internal subdivision and bulkheads, and
providing the infrastructure for a high quality NBCD organisation.
It now seems that the primary protection of critical spaces such as
magazines, steering gear, and ops rooms will be the location of these
compartments deep in the ship.
But it remains possible that some such spaces will quietly
receive some physical protection such as Kevlar for splinter protection.
The inclusion, or not, of such passive protection during the design and
manufacture is likely to be classified, in accordance with recent
practice. In April 2007 the CVF IPT Team Leader, Rear Admiral Bob
Love, stated "Specific Naval and Defence Standards have also been
retained in other areas where a commercial equivalent is not
appropriate such as the magazines. Remember that the size of
the vessel alone does give a degree of protection and this has
allowed us to make pragmatic adjustments to the design."
The CVF design is not "stealthy", but considerable
effort is being made to reduce signatures (radar, heat, acoustic)
to a degree that allows the effective use of passive soft kill
countermeasures and off board decoys. When "clean", a 280m long
65,000 tonnes displacement CVF carrier will have a radar return similar
to a 38m 300 tonnes trawler.
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