Future Aircraft Carrier - CVF

Pre-Downselect - This old page reflects the progress of the programme just prior to the 30 January 2003 decision in favour of BAE Systems.  History already!

Part 1

1. BAE Systems Design

2. Thales Naval Design

3. Miscellaneous Illustrations

For the history of the CVF design in artists impressions, including early or unlikely CVF designs, see here.

For the deck layouts of the various CVF designs considered, see here.

Specification (Provisional)

Table Notes: 

1. The two competing teams have each been developing alternative designs based on operating STOVL or CTOL aircraft.  In September 2002 the MoD decided to take forward the CTOL design, adapted to operate STOVL aircraft in the short to medium term, but with the flexibility be fitted if necessary with catapults and arrestor gear. 

2. The figures are based mainly on the published design parameters from BAE, Thales and the MOD.

The CVF Programme

The decision to replace the UK Royal Navy's (RN's) three current Invincible-class aircraft carriers with two much larger Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) vessels was perhaps the single most important outcome of the UK government's 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Entering service in 2012 and 2015, they are expected to displace about 55,000 tons apiece and each embark up to 48 aircraft, making them among the largest and most powerful warships ever to serve with the RN.

Programme Origins

The current Invincible class of small aircraft carriers are scheduled to leave service between 2010-2015 and preliminary studies in to a possible replacement - initially entitled CVSG(R), later CV(R) and finally CVF - started as early as 1994. 

During the pre-feasibility work three options were considered:

IOne option was a ship life-extension programme (SLEP) for the existing Invincible's.  A study was undertaken by BAe-SEMA in 1995 which concluded that a SLEP was technically risky on account of existing hull fatigue and the problems of inserting an additional hull section to increase capacity.   It was found that the hull could be cut safely at one point only, directly in front of the bridge, and inserting a new 80ft hull section would increase aircraft capacity by just four.  Even when stretched, the CVS's comparatively narrow beam and constricted hangar layout would continue to pose operational problems and, moreover, and would not provide the dramatic increase in air wing capacity offered by the larger new-build CVF.  

t was concluded that a "SLEP and Stretch" was disproportionately expensive given the limited capability improvement conferred by the modifications over a relatively short additional lifespan. 

Another option considered was the conversion of a merchant vessel with a 20 strong airgroup, this was quickly discarded as unsatisfactory on grounds of both cost and operational effectiveness.

The final option considered was new build aircraft carriers in a broad range of designs, the studies examining various STOVL, STOBAR, and CTOL configurations with air groups ranging from 15 to 40 aircraft.

By the end of 1996 the pre-feasibility work was complete and DOR(Sea) concluded that the most effective solution was a new 30-40,000 ton vessel operating a standard airgroup up to 40 fixed wing aircraft and helicopters, plus an additional 10 in surge conditions.  Due to the inevitable high costs, this programme became a major consideration during the 1997-8 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) process.  A special carrier working group was established to critically examine the Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) requirement against the backdrop of the changing strategic environment and the UK's likely future foreign and security policy demands.  

The Strategic Defence Review concluded that the ability to deploy offensive airpower would be central to future force projection operations.  However, it also noted that the UK couldn't be certain that there will always be access to suitable airbases.  Successive operations in the Gulf, Bosnia and Kosovo had demonstrated that aircraft carriers can provide valuable flexibility, as well as offering a coercive presence which contributes to conflict prevention and forestalls the need for war.  The current Invincible class aircraft carriers were designed for Cold War antisubmarine warfare operations in the North Atlantic.  However, the limited size of their air groups meant that they were now less able to fulfil the increasingly challenging security demands facing the UK around the world.  There was thus a clear need for larger vessels, each of which would be capable of carrying and operating a larger and more powerful carrier air group, if the costs could be contained within affordable limits.

The case for CVF was ultimately accepted and the Strategic Defence Review announced that when the Invincible class carrier force reached the end of its service life it would be replaced by two such new large carriers.  The formal requirement - ST(S) 7068 - was subsequently approved at the end of 1998. 

However, despite the SDR decision to build new carriers, as an alternative to the CVF programme the MoD continued to consider the feasibility of extending the service life of two of the three existing Invincible class CVS's by 10 years, i.e. the required in-service date for their replacements would change from 2012 to 2022.  An invitation to tender for the further special refit (FSR) study contract was issued in early 1999 and the work was probably completed by year's end.  The FSR feasibility study addressed various issues including the costs of a life-extension refit; the operational costs of the converted vessels; adaptation costs to enable the ships to operate JSF-class aircraft; and an appropriate refit programme.  

Although its conclusions were never published, the FSR study apparently found that the CVS's cannot be cost-effectively altered to operate the Joint Strike Fighter (assuming the STOVL variant is purchased by the UK), partly because they are simply to small for a plane much larger than the Harrier.  Adoption of the FSR option is now regarded as very unlikely by both defence and industry officials and the significance of the study has been played down by both.  It has been suggested that the MoD aimed to utilise the study simply as a means of pre-empting Treasury pressure to accept the refit option by demonstrating at an early stage that a FSR is not a cost-effective alternative to CVF, and is only capable of producing short-term savings. 

CVF Role

The Invincible class of carriers were designed for Cold War anti-submarine warfare operations, with an airgroup of mainly ASW helicopters plus a limited air defence capability provided by a small number of embarked Sea Harriers. This essentially defensive role is no longer appropriate and the emphasis with he Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) is now on increased offensive air power and an ability to operate a wider range of aircraft in a variety of roles.

The CVF mission statement has been officially defined: "The  statement of mission need for CVF declares: "The CVF is to be a joint defence asset with the primary purpose of providing the UK with an expeditionary offensive air capability that has the flexibility to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles."

Nine top-level Key User Requirements (KURs) for CVF have been laid out, as follows:

• KUR 1 Interoperability: CVF shall be able to contribute to joint/combined operations;

• KUR 2 Integration: CVF shall be able to integrate with the joint battlespace to the extent required to support air group operations, command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) functions and survivability;

• KUR 3 Availability: CVF shall be able to provide one operational and available platform at all times;

• KUR 4 Deployability: CVF shall be able to deploy for operations worldwide;

• KUR 5 Sustainability: CVF shall be able to sustain operations;

• KUR 6 Aircraft operation: CVF shall be able to deploy offensive air power to the sortie-generation profile specified without host-nation support;

• KUR 7 Survivability: CVF shall be able to achieve a high probability of survival;

• KUR 8 Flexibility: CVF shall be able to operate the largest possible range of aircraft; and

• KUR 9 Versatility: CVF shall be able to operate in the widest range of roles.

It is expected that CVF will be tasked:

• As an early coercive presence that can promote conflict prevention through deterrence; 

• As a flexible and rapidly deployable offshore base during expeditionary operations when airfields may be unavailable or denied, or when facilities ashore are still being established; and 

• Contributing to the support of peacekeeping forces, and, when necessary, initiating offensive military action.    

Concurrent with plans for the Future Aircraft Carrier and critical to its success is the "Joint Combat Aircraft" (JCA) programme, formally known as the "Future Carrier Borne Aircraft" (FCBA) programme. The JCA will replace the Harrier GR.9 (the RN's Sea Harrier FA.2 is to be withdrawn from service by 2006) and provide the new carriers with their fighter, strike and reconnaissance capability.

Despite the importance of CVF, the high cost of the CVF project has inevitably started to generate criticism.  In early and mid-2001 reports started to frequently appear in the press that the project faced cancellation, and it has been blamed as the cause [however improbable] of some of the defence cuts that have been imposed on all three services in recent years - not least the RN which in March 2002 was unexpectedly told that it will  losing its Sea Harrier force in 2006, 6 years earlier than anticipated.  Unsurprisingly some senior Army and RAF officers see cancellation of the RN's big ticket plan for new carriers as the best solution to the funding shortfall problem, thus avoiding any cuts for their service.  Perhaps in response to these reports and rumours, on 22 June 2001 the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, reaffirmed the government's commitment to building two new aircraft carriers and buying JSF at total cost of about £10 billion.  

The tragic events of 11 September 2001 have probably played a key role in saving the CVF project from cancellation.  The perceived success of the USN's large carriers in the Afghanistan war of late 2001, and the associated limitations of the much smaller HMS Illustrious in the same action, seems to have greatly reinforced the governments commitment to CVF.

On 22 November 2001 the Minister for Defence Procurement, Lord Bach said: "The future carriers are very much a lynchpin of our planned defence capability and will greatly enhance our ability to intervene decisively in the world's trouble spots. The value of such large carriers is being underlined on a daily basis by our American allies in operations over Afghanistan. That demonstration of power, reach, and strategic mobility of carrier-borne air power provides ample confirmation that our commitment to this project is the right way to go."

In February 2002, the Mr Hoon again stated his own support for the CVF carrier project with what appears to be a key statement that safeguards its future for a year or two: "The [Strategic Defence] Review placed particular emphasis on capabilities relevant to the new circumstances in which we find ourselves – reconnaissance, surveillance, rapid deployment, precision strike, and more effective command and control.  That is why the UK has been able to play such a significant role in the military operations in Afghanistan.  The acquisition of equipment such as the Apache helicopter, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the future carriers will enhance these capabilities still further".

Procurement Process

Industry teams led by BAE Systems and Thales Naval Limited are competing for the prime contractorship of the CVF programme. After completing a first 12-month phase of assessment studies in mid-2001, the rival consortia last November each received £25 million 12-month assessment phase 2 (AP2) contracts. These are due to conclude on 20 November 2002.

BAE Systems leads a team that also consists of Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Vosper Thornycroft, BAE Systems Marine, AMS, Rolls-Royce, Swan Hunter, Babcock BES, Fleet Support Ltd and Strachan & Henshaw. The rival CVF Thales Team also includes Lockheed Martin (participating in both teams with corporate 'firewalls' in place to safeguard competition-sensitive information) together with Raytheon, BMT Defence Services Ltd, DML, Halliburton KBR, Alstom and CAE Electronics. QinetiQ also has a 'firewalled' involvement with both teams, supplying skills and services across of range of disciplines.

Downselection to one preferred contractor is planned in early 2003. It is then planned to contract for Stage 3 of assessment, during which industry and the Defence Procurement Agency's (DPA's) CVF Integrated Project Team (IPT) will work together to further mature the design, reduce risk, refine costings and decide key cost/capability trade-offs.

This will lead to the submission of the business case for the pivotal Main Gate decision, anticipated in first-quarter 2004. Negotiating this largest and most testing approval milestone will pave the way for demonstration and manufacture.

In keeping with 'Smart Acquisition' principles, the competing CVF prime contractors have been given considerable latitude to look at innovative processes and new technologies as they strive to demonstrate their ability to deliver the required capability on schedule and at cost. They have also been scrutinising the design, engineering and production resources available to them across the whole of the UK industrial base.

Those characteristics or criteria judged as mandatory are relatively few: that the carrier will be non-nuclear; of a single-hulled design; capable of embarking up to 48 aircraft; and designed and built in the UK.

Affordability is seen as the critical issue for CVF. Rigorous cost/capability trade-offs, maximum use of suitable off-the-shelf solutions, and judicious use of commercial engineering standards are seen as essential if the new carriers are to come within budget. Business as usual is simply not an option.

Yet achieving cost targets will, at the same time, demand technical innovation, new business practices imported from adjacent markets, and fresh approaches to supply-chain management. For example, both teams are looking at how 'best practice' from merchant shipbuilding, offshore industries and commercial fleet-management operations can be used to simplify build, and reduce maintenance and repair costs through-life.

It should also be borne in mind that CVF is not just about shipbuilding. The programme represents a complex 'system of systems' integration challenge, with the end user anxious to have an asset embodying a real 'swing' capability, enabling it to operate successfully - and cost-effectively - across a range of mission types and roles. It will have a key role as a C4I node, and is an obvious host platform for a joint force headquarters facility.

 

Progress to Date

Formally launched in 1998 the CVF project was soon affected by an approximately 9 months slippage in the JSF Project, and an approximately 21-month delay in the formal JCA down-selection.  The CVF Project time-line has been revised to try to absorb this delay over the period until end-2003.  The current project plan is as follows:

The planned schedule showing how the main milestones, key phases and aircraft programmes interrelate

Under its original procurement strategy, the MoD planned to award parallel competitive Assessment Phase Stage 1 (Analysis of Options) or AP1 contracts to three companies or contractor teams by the end of 1999.  It issued invitations to tender in January 1999 to British Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Marconi Electronic Systems, Raytheon and Thomson-CSF, however by the closing date of 5 May 1999 it had only received bids from two strong industrial teams: British Aerospace (teamed with its new subsidiary Marconi Electronic Systems) and France's Thomson-CSF (teamed with Raytheon Systems Company and British Marine Technology).  The US firms Boeing and Lockheed-Martin, elected not to bid in the face of the major UK companies being tied into a single consortium.

In December 1999 the only two bidding industry teams - led by British Aerospace Land and Sea Systems Ltd and Thomson-CSF NCS France - were both awarded competitive £5.9 million contracts by the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) to undertake an initial package of Analysis of Options work.  

Since the AP1 contracts were awarded, both teams have changed somewhat in both name and composition:

• British Aerospace Land & Sea Systems has now been renamed BAE Systems.  In November 1999, Rolls Royce and Harland & Wolff joined the then British Aerospace team, although Harland and Wolff subsequently parted ways.  In March 2002 BAE Systems signed an agreement with Babcock Engineering Services .

• Thomson-CSF Naval Systems has now been renamed renamed Thales Naval (part of Thales Defence Ltd in the UK, which in turn is part of the French owned Thales Group).  In February 2000 Lockheed-Martin announced a tie-up with the then Thomson-CSF bid.  And in September 2001 Thales announced that Devonport Management Limited (DML) - later joined by parent company Halliburton - had joined its team.

So the two competing contractor teams are now (August 2002): 

BAE Systems, principle partners:

• BAE Systems Future Carrier Office - Prime Contractor

• AMS - C4ISR, Information Systems and Systems Engineering

• Babcock BES - Ship Build Strategy and Collaborative Through Life Support

• BAE Systems - C4ISR, Collaborative Through Life Support

• BAE Systems Sea Systems Group - Ship Design and Build Strategy

• EDS - Systems Integration

• Fleet Support Ltd - Collaborative Through Life Support

• Lockheed Martin - Program Management, Systems and Requirements Engineering, Carrier Air Group Optimization, C4ISR

• Northrop Grumman - Mission Planning, Air Traffic Control, Ship Build Strategy, C4ISR

• QinetiQ - Technology Insertion and Test & Evaluation Programmes

• Rolls-Royce - Propulsion and Through-Life Support

• Strachan & Henshaw - Munitions Handling and Waste Management

• Swan Hunter - Ship Build Strategy

• VT (Vosper Thornycroft) Shipbuilding - Naval Architecture, Ship Build Strategy, Human Factors, Through Life Support, Control Systems.
   

Thales Naval, principle partners: 

• Thales Naval - Prime Contractor

• Lockheed Martin - prime contractor for the Joint Strike Fighter, the company also has expertise in electronics and weapons fitted on recent US carriers (participating in both teams with corporate 'firewalls' to safeguard competition-sensitive information)

• DML -  whole lifecycle requirements for CVF such as systems integration, outfitting, testing and commissioning of warships, together with a detailed understanding of refitting, in-service support and through-life management requirements. 

• Alstom - expertise in electric propulsion and power distribution, bringing to bear experience on Type 45 destroyers and elsewhere.

• Raytheon - a partner on external communication, with experience on US carrier programmes. 

• BMT - ship's design. 

• Halliburton KBR - advice on construction and assembly.

• QinetiQ  - supplying skills and services across of range of disciplines (a 'firewalled' involvement)

• CAE Electronics - ship management systems.

The key functional requirements imposed by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) for the AP1 related to the needs for a sortie-generation profile, battlespace integration, and ship speed sufficient to ensure both rapid deployability and the conduct of air operations.  Non-functional requirements included availability, survivability, adaptability, enough stowage space for both ship and aircraft fuel, and adequate stores.  The AP1 activities encompassed cost/capability/programme trade-offs; risk analysis; and concept development; and provided information to feed into parallel studies to determine the choice of JCA to be embarked aboard the new carriers.  As part of the AP1 studies, both industry teams investigated key enabling technologies and developed six indicatively costed concept ship design studies for large (40 aircraft) and small (30 aircraft) variants of generic short take-off vertical landing (STOVL), short take-off but arrested recovery (STOBAR), and conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) designs.  The work took account of issues like the type and number of aircraft to be carried and the survivability of the ships.  Reportedly the BAE team added to its submission a seventh un-solicited study in to a STOVL hybrid design.  Although primarily intended to operate the STOVL version of JSF, an angled deck, arrestor gear and a single waist catapult are added to allow the operation of conventional fixed wing aircraft such as the Northrop Grumman E-2C for AEW.    

The AP1 design studies (eventually totalling some 300 "deliverables") were initially submitted to the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) in May 2000 and their evaluation was completed by June 2001.  This was done partly with 3D virtual reality simulation in an exercise known as Project Vitesse, which was one of the most complex fully interactive simulations ever undertaken.  The virtual reality testing used the "Envision" simulation package developed by Delmia and the tests were conducted by engineering consultancy, System Engineering & Assessment.  The spectators wore stereo eyeglasses and the simulation was given a 3D effect courtesy of a wide screen projection system rendering the simulation in stereo.  The simulations involved real-time, interactive, routine operations, such as the actions of hanger and flight deck operators.  The manoeuvrability of planes within confined hanger and deck areas was also tested. The aim of the simulation was to highlight potential problems in manning and on-deck aircraft movement and to avoid the sort of costly mistake that occurred when the French navy introduced its new Charles De Gaulle aircraft carrier - carrier's flight deck was found to be too short for Hawkeye E-2C aircraft to land on and putting it right cost around £50m. 

(Above) An indication of just how complex the CVF modeling is.

Following the announcement in January 2001 that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will fulfill the FCBA (now JCA) role, assessment work for the CVF programme focused on the two JSF variants available; Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) and the Carrier Variant (CV) conventional take off and landing - the STOBAR configuration being dropped. 

In October 2001 Lockheed Martin won the competition to build JSF with their F-35 aircraft. The output from the CVF Assessment Phase work fed into the parallel JSF/F-35 selection studies and helped inform the decision  on the choice of F-35 variant be embarked aboard the new carriers.   The STOVL variant was finally selected in September 2002.  The decision process weighed the RN's existing STOVL training and experience, and the lower ship construction and running costs of a STOVL carrier, against the significant aircraft weight & performance benefits of CTOL operations, the ability to cross-deck operate with US and French carriers, and a greater possibility of landing-on damaged aircraft.

The delay in JCA selection (or rather selection between the F-35 CV and STOVL variants) from the original date of late 2000 left a hole in the Assessment Phase timescales as trying to design in detail a carrier without fixed knowledge of the air element and its mode of operation is impossible.  The JCA decision deferment has resulted in changes to the scope and timing of the CVF assessment phases, and completion of the Assessment Phase Stage 1 that was originally scheduled for December 2000 was allowed to slip to June 2001.  Trying to make the best of the delay, Ali Baghaei, leader of the CVF integrated project team in the DPA, said: "There will be more focus on a generic approach to the requirement before we look at design options in the period prior to JCA down selection. We are currently assessing proposals from industry on how their programmes would be adjusted to accommodate these changes to the CVF programmes."   In the meantime, the rival BAE Systems and Thales teams used the extra time to pursue a twin-track policy:- concentrating on generic carrier designs and looking at areas where commonality can be maximised below the flight deck and hangar deck irrespective of the JCA selection. 

In spring 2001, BAE Systems and Thales were expected to be awarded to Assessment Phase Stage 2 (AP2) contracts in June or July 2001, but this was delayed amidst reports of hard negotiations between the MOD and the two contractor teams, and an insistence by the contractor teams that the value of the contracts on offer was insufficient for the work and risks involved.  It is public knowledge that unfortunately a rather adversarial relationship has developed between MOD and the contractor teams.  It's been admitted on all sides that a challenge during AP2 will be to build on relationships established during AP1, and develop a more positive and productive partnership ethos.

On 22 November 2001 it was finally announced that the MOD had awarded BAE Systems and Thales Naval Ltd competing 12 month contracts worth around £30 million (actually £25m plus VAT) each for AP2.  Revised and shortened compared with original plans, AP2 will now run until 20 November 2002 and the competing consortia will concentrate on refining their design proposals and risk reduction, their work providing the basis for the choice of a preferred prime contractor by the MoD in early 2003.  

The Assessment Phase Stage 2 (Risk Reduction and Cost Capability Trades) work will be undertaken over six phases and will involve risk reduction and more detailed work to develop parameters for the detailed design, build and support of the preferred carrier option.  In the Assessment Phase Stage 1 (Analysis of Options) little emphasis was put on restricting the cost of the proposed designs, during AP2 keeping within budgets and cost constraints will become a very important factor.  The MOD will also be seeking to identify Differentiators between the two proposals that will enable the downselect decision, and that can be audited and defended. 

Initially both STOVL and CTOL designs had to be considered in AP2, a BAE spokesmen stated in early 2002: 'We've agreed with the MoD that we'll do a certain amount of twin tracking. If anything can be generic that's fine but at certain points the variants diverge.  We'll take both designs to a level of maturity by the third quarter of this year.'  

But in September 2002 the selection of the STOVL variant of the Lockheed Martin F-35 JSF was announced and the new carriers will therefore be designed to operate this, the two consortia are thus able to now focus on a single design concept.  However given that the new carriers are planned to have a service life of up to fifty years - longer than that expected for the aircraft - BAE Systems and Thales, have also been asked by the MOD to opt for a design which can be adapted to operate more conventional aircraft types if necessary later in the ships' lives.  To this end, the ships will have the capability to be fitted with catapults and arrestor gear, although they will be initially built with the "ski-ramp" for STOVL operations.

A down selection to a single preferred prime contractor will be made about January 2003.  The selected prime contractor will be awarded a final Assessment Phase Stage 3 (AP3) contract, probably worth £10 million, in early 2003.  AP3 will will focus on further risk reduction, decide between key cost/capability trade-offs, further mature the selected design and build strategy, and refine costings.  It should deliver to the MOD in mid-2003 a robust, fully costed proposal for the Demonstration and Manufacture of two vessels.  The preferred prime contractor will be required to ensure the maximum degree of competition amongst potential sub-contractors in order to obtain the best proposal price.  

Currently, final CVF build approval by ministers (Main Gate) is planned for December 2003. A contract award to a winning single prime contractor for the D&M Phase is due to follow in early 2004.

In total the MoD will spend about £110 million in total on the Assessment Phase, which is about 7 or 8 per cent of the CVF Project budget.  The two contractor consortia are expected to put in some of their own money in order to produce the best and winning bid. 

The outcome of the FJCA downselection, and associated debates on 'future proofing', is most keenly awaited by the DPA and the two potential prime contractors (both of whom have established their project offices on the outskirts of Bristol within easy reach of the DPA's Abbey Wood headquarters). As AP2 approaches its conclusion, they are keen that twin-track should be truncated as quickly as possible so they can mature their respective designs, refine their business process models and increase confidence in their costings around a single solution.

"The DPA wants to know which team is most likely to deliver the most affordable, lowest-risk, value-for-money CVF solution," says Peter Robertson, Thales Naval Limited's managing director, "and which is most likely to be able to manage the programme successfully."

He adds: "There's no bid as such at this stage. The two teams will not submit a box of reports and a price. Rather it is a process of bringing designs, studies and cost models to an acceptable degree of maturity, and demonstrating an ability to establish a long-term relationship with the customer.

"Our team has been put together on the basis that we need to capture the widest body of experience in order to design, build and support these vessels," says Robertson. "No warships on this scale have been built in the UK for decades.

"The UK's record on warship prime contracting to date has not been a particularly happy one. Thales has already demonstrated its ability to deliver on the international market.

"We recognise the need to bring in expertise from overseas, and to apply innovative solutions from other business sectors to the design, construction and integration of the carrier," he adds. "And we are also very aware that we are not just delivering a ship, but a capability - a complex system that must operate in the wider battlespace environment."

According to Nigel Stewart, BAE Systems' managing director Future Carrier, prime contracting in this vernacular represents a lifetime commitment. "It means single-point responsibility for delivering operational ship performance on time and on cost. It means managing programme risk. And it means whole-ship management and support for up to 50 years.

"CVF will be part of an integrated force-projection capability, and vital to protecting long-term future of our industry. From the BAE Systems perspective, we believe our existing warship prime contract experience in the UK gives us an unrivalled insight into challenges of prime contracting, and the benefits to be gained from partnering."

Acknowledging that the company's naval prime-contracting record to date has not been without its problems, Stewart adds: "We've learned a lot about running a design programme, and the problems attendant in transitioning from design to manufacture.

"It is an extremely complex business, one we have invested heavily in. Through experience and learning we have created a solid foundation on which to build. Type 45, for example, has shown the significant gains to be made by establishing a close working relationship with the customer early on."

For its part, the DPA must decide which of the two teams it feels is best equipped to deliver the programme, and best able to partner the MoD over the longer term. In a marked departure from previous practice, the CVF IPT is conducting the competition according to continuous assessment - rather than a traditional tender assessment approach - on the basis it will be a fairer and faster means of discriminating between the two competing contractors. According to the DPA, it will also enable the IPT to address significant but less tangible 'soft' issues - notably the contractor's ability to establish a partnering relationship with the MoD over the longer term.

Under this new approach, the IPT conducts monthly audits and quarterly programme reviews to progressively evaluate and score the two contractor teams. A software package developed with the assistance of Telelogic is supporting real-time assessment of work to date.

"Throughout the assessment phase we have a clear understanding of everything the companies are doing, with full traceability and auditability," says Ali Baghaei, CVF IPT leader. "The result is that the moment AP2 ends in November we will be able to send our final recommendation to ministers for their consideration."

One of the key objectives of the assessment phase is to attain a high degree of design maturity, driving down risk before Main Gate. "We will have design maturity from both competitors in the range of 40-50% by the end of this year," says Baghaei." By the time we get to Main Gate we will have about 65% design maturity."

And it is not just a question of shipbuilding. "We are asking the competitors to define the full depth of what I term as a ship procurement strategy for this new class of ship," says Baghaei, "and that is a lot more than selecting shipyards for block construction and final assembly.

"The competitors have to define the relationships they will have with their partners and across the supply chain. The major part of the value of the [Demonstration and Manufacture] contract will be in the supply chain, outside the prime contractor and its immediate team. It may involve hundreds of smaller companies and we need to see how they propose to manage these complex relationships."

In the assessment phase, the DPA has tasked both industry teams to take the same high-level User Requirement Document (URD) - the capability to which the MoD aspires - and translating it into a System Requirement Document (SRD). It means the IPT will be judging between two different SRDs and two different cost models.

With the MoD anxious to see its requirements are being properly addressed, modelling and simulation have become central to the competition. Both teams have built up distributed interactive simulation environments that enable tailored high-fidelity models - for example, sortie generation - to interact so that assessments can be made on the impact of key variables on overall system performance.
 

CVF Options

The contending designs for the CVF requirement originally (1999) consisted of three basic launch variants:

1. An aircraft carrier with ski-jump and axial deck layout equipped to handle Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft such as an advanced Harrier or the planned new RN/USMC Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) STOVL variant.

2. An aircraft carrier fitted with angled deck, ski-jump and arrestor gear (similar to the Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov) to handle Short Take Off but Arrested Landing (STOBAR) aircraft such as a navalised EF-2000 Typhoon (Eurofighter). 

3. An aircraft carrier fitted with angled deck, catapults and arrestor gear to handle Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft such as the French Rafale M, American F/A-18E Super Hornet, or the US Navy (CV) variant of the JSF.  This type of operation is also know in American parlance as Catapult Take Off and Arrested landing (CATOBAR).

in 2000 a fourth option emerged:

4. A hybrid carrier.  For example, a STOVL hybrid would have some steam catapults and arrestors needed for conventional aircraft such as the E-2C Hawkeye AEW aircraft, while a conventional take-off hybrid would have a ramp at the front of the flight deck for STOVL planes. 

and finally in 2002 a fifth option:

5. An adaptable carrier.  A CTOL carrier modified for STOVL operations for a bow ski-jump, but able to be fitted catapults and arrestor gear if required at some point in the future.

Lacking heavy and bulky catapults and arrestor gear the STOVL configured carrier design was anticipated to be the smallest and cheapest option, and to make best use of existing RN and RAF experience and training with the Harrier.  It's also considered that a given number of STOVL aircraft can maintain a slightly higher sortie rate than the same number of STOBAR or CTOL aircraft.  However, CTOL also has significant advantages.  The purchase of off-the-shelf aircraft such as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and E-2C Hawkeye 2000 would avoid the risks and cost of developing the JSF STOVL version and a new AEW aircraft - thereby mitigating the greater cost of their carrier platform and their higher "fly-away" unit plane cost.  Also, CTOL aircraft can generally launch and land at higher weights than STOVL aircraft, giving them considerable advantages in terms of payload and range.  And with CTOL carriers the RN would be able to cross-deck aircraft with the French and US navies.

Table 1: Summary of Characteristics of the CVF Options

The choice of CVF configuration was expected to be effectively made in late 2000 when the selection of an aircraft to meet the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) requirement was originally due to be announced.  The STOVL configuration of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) had long been officially considered a strong favourite for FCBA/FJCA, but the JSF programme was  experiencing lengthy delays and the STOVL demonstrators did not fly until early 2001.  But despite the delays, in late 2000 the MoD Equipment Acquisition Committee (EAC) recommended procurement of JSF for JCA, expressing as expected a preference for STOVL.  Without waiting for the success (or otherwise) of the JSF technology demonstrator trials to become clear, on 17 January 2000 the UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the USA committing $2 billion (over £1.3 billion) to the next Engineering and Manufacturing and Development (EMD).  This decision was necessary to enable the UK to remain a full partner in the JSF programme.  The UK also announced that another £600 million had been allocated to modifying JSF to UK requirements and integrating it with CVF.  And on 26 October 2001 it was announced by the American Department of Defence that Lockheed Martin had been chose as prime contractor to develop and build the Joint Strike Fighter, now designated the F-35.

STOVL or CV F-35

Although the UK firmly committed to JSF for meeting its JCA requirement in January 2001, no decision was initially made between the two carrier capable variants.  Instead the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) put in to place a mechanism to decide whether the UK should opt for the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant, hitherto the UK's planning assumption, or the Carrier Variant JSF (the latter actually designated as the "CV" variant because the land-based JSF variant for the US Air Force is confusingly designated the "CTOL" variant!).  One factor for this indecision was the fact that the USA was considering abandoning the technically risky JSF STOVL variant, and concentrating on just the CV and CTOL variants, another was the greater than expected difference in performance between the STOVL and CV variants

The MoD's difficulty in coming to a conclusion on FJCA in part reflected the continuing uncertainties about the relative cost and performance of the F-35 STOVL and CV variants, their impact on the carrier design, and their implications for through-life cost of ownership. It also had to take into account the results of operational analysis examining the UK's overall future offensive air capability, and 'softer' issues such as the concept of operations.

"The decision to be made between the STOVL and [CV] variants will be a difficult one," said Wing Cdr Green said RAF Wing Cdr Mark Green of the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) integrated project team (IPT). "They are being viewed as equal competitors. Our final decision will be informed by the results of the current concept demonstration phase, study work to examine the UK's future offensive air capability, and a range of 'softer' issues such as our concept of operations."  

"It's a very complex decision-making matrix, and the arguments for and against are very tight," said one senior maritime aviator. "It goes without saying that the CV variant gives us access to more target sets, will have a longer range and a greater 'bring back' capability, but it will undoubtedly come at greater cost. I suspect it will ultimately be a balance of investment decision."

The generally favourable experience of STOVL carrier operations over the previous 15 years had by the mid-1990s brought the RN close to prescribing a STOVL solution for the then Sea Harrier Replacement (subsequently incarnated as the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft and now JCA).  The service was an avowed proponent of STOVL on account of, amongst other things: better sortie-generation rates; reduced aircraft impact on overall platform size and cost; and the ability to operate in higher sea states. Yet in 2001 these assumptions began to be revisited. For one thing, the size of the carrier had been driven up quite significantly to accommodate and operate an air wing sufficient to achieve desired sortie-generation rates. As a result, CVF was likely to displace around 55,000 tons regardless of whether it operated a STOVL or CV air group. At this size, sea state impacts less on aircraft operating limits. Industry sources suggested that CVF should be able to conduct operations in conditions up to Sea State 6.  A CV-configured carrier would enable cross-deck interoperability with the USN and the French Navy, and open the way to a more capable MASC solution, nullifying the misalignment between the JSF downselection and the MASC programme.  By mid 2002 the Royal Navy increasingly saw the CV version as being cheaper, flying further and carrying more.  "The requirement is value for money," said Commander Ron Finlayson, in charge of the Royal Navy's surface ship capabilities. "We plan to run these ships for 50 years and in cooperation with other navies. We wouldn't expect to regularly run U.S. Navy F/A-18s or French Rafales off them, but do we want to be locked into a configuration that only STOVL aircraft can use?".  

Also, some people started to have challenge the gradient of the additional training penalty incurred for CV vis-a-vis STOVL, arguing that high-fidelity simulators, JSF's advanced flight-control system and modern auto-land facilities make carrier landings far less challenging than hitherto assumed. Assumptions on the cost delta between a STOVL and a CV carrier also proved overly pessimistic. Sources from both contractor teams suggested a differential of between £80 million and £100 million per ship at build, significantly less than £200 million previously speculated. 

But in mid 2002 it was also reported (e.g. by JDW) that the higher echelons of the RAF - the service that will 'own' the aircraft - were firmly inclined towards STOVL. This is in part because of its flexibility of deployment - frequent mention is made of its ability to disembark on to rough airstrips ashore - and also because of the lower training penalty to keep those predominantly RAF-manned FJCA squadrons carrier current. MoD and industry sources further suggested that the RAF was also anxious that FJCA should not threaten Eurofighter Tranche 3, nor dilute its aspirations for the Future Offensive Air System.

UK industry also voiced its support for selecting the STOVL variant of the F-35 for FJCA. Rolls-Royce, as developer and supplier of the STOVL variant's shaft-driven lift fan, stands to gain far greater industrial benefit from a decision in favour of STOVL, which would in turn bring UK political weight to bear on the US Department of Defense's commitment to the USMC STOVL offtake. BAE Systems sources also indicated that, from a programmatic and long-term business outlook, a decision in favour of STOVL would be favoured.

The MoD's Investment Approvals Board (IAB) re- convened on 12 August 2002 to consider the downselection of the STOVL or CV variant of JSF for FJCA, after being unable to reach a decision in a previous meeting in early July.

Based on overall affordability, backed by a strong industrial advocacy, the STOVL variant of JSF was reckoned to have the edge on balance.  The Defence Procurement Minister, Lord Bach, finally announced on 30 September 2002 the selection of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as the JCA. He said that choosing the STOVL variant of JSF would build on the RAF and RN's "unique and valuable knowledge of STOVL aircraft acquired during nearly four decades of operations of Harrier on land and sea".  He went on to cite the STOVL variant's short runway and land-basing flexibility as a major discriminator in the downselection decision.

Another factor that tipped the decision in favour of the F-35 STOVL variant was the aircraft's ability to meet an ISD of 2012. "Timing was a key driver," said Chief of Naval Staff and First Sea Lord Adm Alan West. "All the indications were that if we went for the [CV] option we would have incurred a delay of about two years on our programme."

MoD and industry officials also acknowledge that selection of the F-35 STOVL variant over the CV version would bring greater benefits to UK industry participation in the JSF programme. Rolls-Royce (which has primary responsibility for the STOVL lift system) and BAE Systems will in particular gain from the decision.

Ultimately, the decision was seen by observers as hinging on the wider balance of investment judgments.  Returning to catapult-launch and arrested-recovery operations with the JSF CV variant would have cost more, but pound for pound represents the most cost-effective way of getting bombs on target.  The chosen STOVL option will deliver a more modest capability somewhat below that of a CV solution, but will cost less overall.  That in turn leaves more money available to be spent elsewhere in the MoD's hard-pressed equipment programme.  But by selecting an "adaptive" design for CVF, the door has not been completely closed on the possibility of CTOL operations in the future.

CVF Design

Important note, in all early statements about CVF the MoD and DPA seem to deliberately avoid stating whether the tonnages it sometimes mentions are light, standard or full load, given the considerable difference between these (20-30% between light and full load for large warships!), this is not a minor omission - a 40,000 tonnes light displacement carrier could easily displace 50,000 tonnes full load.

Also, in all designs, the stated tonnage is actually quite low for the probable dimensions when compared to older generations of aircraft carriers that have served in the RN and elsewhere.  This is due to a combination of:  little or no heavy armour; the lighter weight of many modern systems, components and materials; modern weight saving construction techniques; and a "cost-effective" commercialisation of hull construction standards in accordance with the new Lloyds Naval Ship Rules.  Unlike all British carriers prior to the Invincible Class, no significant amount of armour is likely to be included in the design - whether or not some critical spaces such as the Operations Room will receive armour (steel or composite) protection will depend upon the outcome of vulnerability studies.

When plans for the new carriers were formally announced in 1998 their displacement was estimated at 30,000 to 40,000 tonne and it was stated that the maximum CVF length being considered was 300 metres (984 feet).   But the displacement, and to a lesser extent the size, of CVF has been creeping up steadily since 1998.

Initial CVF studies indicated that the smallest practical design for a STOVL carrier able to support a permanent air group of 40 aircraft, and temporarily an extra 10 aircraft, would be about 38,000 tonnes.  Early published artist's impressions for the STOVL variant of the new carrier showed a ship of about 274 metres (900 ft) length.  However, both the catapult launched (CTOL) and the Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) variants would require a larger conventional carrier design equipped with an angled flight deck and arrested wires for landing.  The smallest practical design for a STOBAR or CTOL carrier able to support the required size of airgroup was determined by the DPA to be about 43-46,000 tonnes.  BAE Systems stated that a CTOL or STOVL design would have to be about 10,000 tonnes larger than a STOVL design.  Both the DPA concepts published in 1999 and the BAE concepts published in 2000 showed CTOL and STOBAR CVF designs significantly larger than the STOVL designs.  

By this stage the CVF design began to very much reflect the strong influence of Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, then First Sea Lord and later Chief of the Defence Staff, who's maxim was "Air is free, and steel is cheap".  Certainly a large ship would ensure that (unlike the Invincible's) that there's plenty of room for mid-life update and expansion, and in an emergency the carrier could carry a much larger "surge" airgroup than normal.  The large size is to provide the greatest possible deck area which not only facilitates aircraft handling but also allows the incorporation of large magazines and fuel stowage. Magazines will, in fact, have a significant impact upon ship size and costs. The Royal Navy has demonstrated that a large ship is not only cheaper to build in terms of cost per tonne but also has lower maintenance costs.  However the larger hull sizes will create some operational and support problems, for example a lack of suitable dry docks, which could be expensive to resolve. 

The STOBAR CVF design was eliminated in January 2001, at the end of Assessment Phase Stage 1, but the two competing carrier contractors continued to develop alternative an ever larger designs based on operating STOVL or CTOL aircraft.

In 2000 BAE Systems stated that it was studying various size CVF designs in range 250-340m long and 30-50,000 tonnes displacement.  

Numerous magazine and newspaper reports in 2001 and 2001 suggested that CVF would displace at least 50,000 tonnes (which was also mentioned by the Head of the DPA in May 2001), increasing to perhaps 60,000 tonnes for a CTOL design. 

French Navy and DGA officials after discussions and exchanges with their UK counterparts in early 2001 suggested that the planned weight for an empty CVF was now slightly over 55,000 tonnes, this would imply a full load displacement of about 70,000 tonnes!  While was too going to far, it perhaps indicates some of the extremely large designs under consideration at that point in time. 

In November 2001 BAE Systems stated that it was now studying CVF designs in the range 250-340m long and 40-60,000 tonnes. In March 2002, Mark Kane, managing director for the BAE Systems bid estimated that their ship is likely to be around 300m long, with a displacement of 58,000 tonnes and a 72m-wide angled flight deck. If STOVL the ship might be slightly smaller, but Kane points out the advantage of a larger model is that it would give more flexibility, allowing future aircraft of different types to operate from the carrier.

In February 2002, Jonathan Rich, the CVF Programme Requirements Manager told a Naval Air Warfare conference that studies by Thales and BAE suggested that to deliver the desired fighting strength, CVF displacement needed to be between 52,000 and 58,000 tonnes when fully loaded with fuel and munitions. At the end of their intended 30-to-50-year lives, during which they would inevitably gain weight, the displacement would be up to 64,000 tonnes.  With lengths of 262 to 292 metres (860 to 958 feet), the ships will be not much shorter than the 333-metre USN Nimitz Class carriers, and may be wider than the U.S. ships. 

BAE identified in their assessment work that a key metric to the ships sortie rate (150 a day being the minimum requirement) is deck size, they found that a large clear flight deck reduces the constant reshuffling of aircraft and allows ancillary operations like AEW and ASW helo's to continue in their own deck areas without getting in the way of the JSF fighters.  This has driven up the size (although not necessarily the displacement or cost in direct proportion) of the BAE CVF designs - they have considered designs as long as 340 metres!  Perhaps unsurprisingly, BAE believe that they can comfortably exceed the 130 sorties/day requirement. 

The BAE CTOL CV design dating to about May 2002 was 50,000 tonnes light, 64,000 tonnes full load, and just over over 300m long.  The anticipated airgroup was 24 or 36 F-35's (CV variant), 4 E-2 Hawkeye’s, and 6 Merlin HM.1  Aviation facilities include 2 steam cats with steam generators and  2 large deck edge elevators.  The alternative STOVL variant was 46,000 tonnes light and 58,000 tonnes full load.  No armament is carried except for ILMS/CIWS mounts of a still undetermined model (Phalanx, Sea RAM, ...) plus a few manually operated light calibre guns.

Interestingly, in order to further maximise the available deck space, the island of the  BAE CVF designs has constantly been been significantly revised.  The early concepts had a large long island, perhaps a typical characteristic of British aircraft carriers!  However by 2001 it had been made much smaller and very stealthy, although with a very prominent and almost observatory style bridge and FLYCO.  Indeed it was probably as small and as compact as practical, barely large enough for the four concealed funnels optimised for low IR signature.  Space was allowed for fitting a Sampson multifunction radar, if budget permits, as well as for surveillance this could provide PAAMS fire control functions for Aster missiles fired by accompanying Type 45 destroyers.  The long range S1850 search radar has now moved to a separate main mast further aft.  The latest designs show what's either once again a single island broken by an athwartship tunnel, (aka CVA-01 back in the 1960's), or perhaps the construction is more like two small islands connected by a flying bridge over a lift.

Thales announced in April 2002 that their CVF design was 290 metres long, would displace about 50,000 tonnes (presumably full load), emphasizing the importance of the ship/air interface the design unusually gone has two "islands" for masts, bridge and control towers, instead of the traditional single structure.  The twin island design provides greatly enhanced operational survivability by allowing the physical separation of key ship (bridge - forward) and flying control (flyco - aft) functions in separate islands, while offering command and control redundancy for the ship as whole. Additionally, air flow studies show that this island configuration improves the 'air wake' (wind-over-deck) environment for approaching aircraft.  The concept also separates some of the ships principal sensors, reducing interference affects and eliminating some trunking within the ship for cooling intakes and exhaust flows.

Like BAE Systems. Thales been seeking to maximise flight deck area.  They are achieving this with exceptionally large side sponsons which provide a very wide flight deck - over 70 metres (230 ft).  Large sponsons relative to the hull size can cause ship stability and motion problems which restrict air operations in high sea states, thus to help reduce excessive ship roll motion damping devices such as large fin stabilisers and the SATRAP moving weight system fitted to Charles de Gaulle are likely to be used.  The Thales design has two large deck lifts - one between the two large islands and one aft of the flyco position.  The large hanger deck is high enough to ensure that any aircraft likely to be embarked can be maintained anywhere, eliminating the need to move airframes around during maintenance (e.g. as had to be done on board the old HMS Ark Royal IV)

Clearly there had been considerable growth in size of the CVF compared with original estimates, and in mid 2002 the press reported that the RN was under some pressure by the MOD to keep the size down to 45,000 tonnes to make basing at Portsmouth easier, and avoid the need for expensive dredging and a standby berth at Southampton.  It would seem that this pressure (Treasury driven?) has been resisted.

In 2000, BAE Systems spent private-venture funds during AP1 to develop a 'hybrid' CVF design. Its concept envisaged a carrier configured with a waist catapult and arrestor gear for launch and recovery of CV-type aircraft, together with a ski-jump forward and a large recovery area for STOVL operations. Although not publicised, it is understood that Thales also briefed the MoD on a hybrid design concept.  While some in the MoD's equipment capability customer community welcomed the initiative, the DPA was markedly less enthusiastic about possible hybrid solutions. "The hybrid was not optimised for either STOVL or CV," said one industry source, "so we were told that we were answering a question that wasn't on the exam paper." 

Although the hybrid design was not formally being considered, its advantages were noted by the CVF IPT team, and it became apparent that the CTOL designs being proposed could be adapted to operate STOVL aircraft with minimum change (a fact that Thales were already emphasising by their use of a common hull) and could be modified if necessary with catapults and arrestor gear to operate a future generation of assisted launch and recovery aircraft.  It emerged during early 2002 that officials in the MoD's equipment capability community were seriously contemplating a 'smart' carrier approach. This would ensure that the ship design was sufficiently flexible to adapt to new aircraft, unmanned air vehicles and/or unmanned combat air vehicles entering service during the course of its 50 year service life.

Thus in early 2002 both BAE and Thales began edging towards flexible CTOL and STOVL designs with very similar characteristics - reflecting the MOD's increasing preference that the selected design could be converted from one to the other during build or a later refit - e.g. a STOVL design could be adopted that has an angled flight deck configuration and space and weight allowance to add arrestor wire engines and catapults at a later time.  Indeed Thales had been always stressed the commonality of their CTOL designs and STOVL hulls, and BAE also began  emphasising that their larger CTOL design could easily be adapted to a STOVL configuration and ordered as such, but the MOD would then have the option to convert it over to CTOL if the requirement appeared.

At the time of the JCA selection decision in favour of the STOVL variant in September 2002, it was simultaneously announced that the two rival CVF teams had been asked to take forward decided to take forward not the STOVL CVF design, but rather an adaptable CTOL design, modified to operate STOVL in the short to medium term, but with the flexibility to operate other types of aircraft (including UAV's) that require assisted launch and arrested landing after the F35 has left service.

The adaptable CVF design will include provisions for the retrofit of catapults and arrestor gear at a later date.  The ski-jump will be of something of a bolt on nature" (probably using a split design similar to the Invincible Class, rather than integrated in to the bow hull structure like Admiral Kuznetov).  There will be voids where the cats and arrestor gear would be fitted, and although marked out for STOVL operations the flight deck form will effectively incorporate an angled deck - which could be easily modified in to a landing lane for arrested aircraft landings. 

While the decision would be some increase in ship acquisition costs compared with selecting a purely STOVL CVF design, it will safeguard the investment in the two platforms (CVF and JCA).  It will also leave the UK well-placed to adjust its programme in light of any changes to the USN's and USMC's JSF acquisition plans.

The selected approach terminates the previous twin-track procurement strategy, whereby the CVF IPT has asked BAE Systems and Thales to develop CVF designs specially optimised for STOVL and CV air groups.  In effect, the decision to adopt a 'future proofed' design has de-coupled the carrier platform from the choice of JCA, resolving an obvious paradox: that a carrier optimised purely for fixed-wing STOVL and rotary-wing operations would clearly lack the flexibility "to be able to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest range of roles". 

After the announcement Thales claimed that its design from the outset incorporated the flexibility to operate a mix of Short Take off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft along with helicopters and potentially Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. In order to utilise the full operational potential of the CVF/STOVL JSF weapons system capability, Thales has now adopted a novel extended centre line runway option, that will be used on occasions when it is necessary for JSF to carry increased payloads.  BAE has also made changes to its CTOL design, which it now terms an "Adaptable Carrier" variant.

According to MOD announcements in September 2002, basic CVF details will include a length of about 290m long (951 ft), a maximum beam of about 246 feet, a maximum draft of more than 31 feet, and displace between 55,000-60,000 tonnes (presumably full load).  They will be able to accommodate up to 48 JCA, AgustaWestland Merlin ASW helicopters and maritime airborne surveillance and control aircraft.

By early 2002 both consortia agreed that the best solution is a mono-hull configuration and both are offering designs whose flight deck will be slightly shorter than that of the US Navy's Nimitz class (332m) but longer than that of the French Charles de Gaulle (261m). Beyond this, however, the competitors' hull forms and approaches to construction are very different. Thales has opted for the traditional format of a V-shaped hull extended with box-shaped sponsors to provide extra hangar and flight- deck space, while BAE Systems prefers a flared hull to provide extra internal space and to reduce the ship's radar cross section.

Surprisingly for ships of this size and importance, in order to keep costs down the MOD did not originally require that the CVF design have "flagship" facilities, presumably it was anticipated that these will be provided by an accompanying Type 45 destroyers or Albion Class LPD's.  However this requirement has now re-emerged given the obvious suitability of CVF in terms of space and accommodation for a flag role during large deployments, particularly compared with a Type 45 destroyer.

Crew Size

Manning levels, regarded as key discriminator between the Thales and BAE designs, have been the subject of extensive human-factors analysis. The two contractors are being encouraged to aim for a crew of about 600, similar to the order of today's Invincible-class ships. Additionally, they must also develop appropriate schemes of complement and identify training requirements, taking into account the RN's new TOPMAST manning structure.  It is hoped that the normal peace time "lean-manned" CVF crew complement (including airgroup) will be similar to the 1,200 of an Invincible-class ship, this will presumably increase if a maximum size airgroup is carried, or a command staff (normally Commander UK Naval Force (COMUKNAVFOR), or a Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) Afloat is embarked.  In 2000 BAE Systems stated that its various size CVF designs would require a crew of 1100 to 1400.  In November 2001 it also made the slightly confusing statement that the various CVF designs it was examining would have "600 to 1100 crew with embarked squadron and Command Staffs".  In October 2002 BAE said that their CVF design would have  600 crew, with embarked squadron and Command staffs up to 1400 personnel.

It's intended that crew accommodation on CVF will be at least to the high standard recently developed for the new Type 45 destroyers.  Instead of "traditional" large mess decks it's intended that Junior Rates will have 6 berth cabins, Senior Rates will have 4 or 2 berth cabins, while Officers will have shared or individual cabins.   [This will all be a revelation to anyone who experienced the inadequate and over-crowded accommodation of RN carriers in the 1960's and '70's.]   Its expected that about 10% of the ships crew will be female and the accommodation and "hotel" facilities will be designed with this taken in to consideration. 

There will also be considerable excess accommodation for an embarked military form of up to 1000., although perhaps to a more austere standard.  This could be used for embarked military detachments (e.g. a full Commando of Royal Marines - complete with supporting weapons and equipment), sea training classes (e.g. RNR, BRNC midshipmen, etc.), and for humanitarian purposes (e.g. accommodating evacuees and refugees).  A small hospital with comprehensive medical facilities will be fitted.

A key user requirements are substantially higher availability to the fleet and great flexibility in ship employment - the CVF must be equally effectively in combat missions or delivering humanitarian aid.. Achieving this flexibility, and with a smaller crew, implies that more automation will be needed in operating the ship's systems.  This poses all sorts of challenges, for example if a trivial mechanical failure (e.g. to a fresh water distillation plant) could potentially stop the ship fulfilling its task due to lack of any on-board expertise to make a repair, then that's unacceptable. 

The designed service life for the CVF's was originally to be 30 years (the same as the Invincible Class), but the IPT's target is now 50 years.  

Airgroup

A driving force behind the whole CVF programme is the desire to get a much larger airgroup to sea than the current Invincible Class carriers can embark.  It's a fundamental requirement that the adopted CVF design will be able to accommodate a permanent airgroup of up to 40 aircraft, and be able to temporarily accept an additional 10 support aircraft for a total of up to 50 in "surge" conditions.  The CVF was also originally required to be able to sustain up to 150 sorties every 24-hour period, a cycle of about 12 sorties every two hours, but the figure has since been reduced to 130 per 24 hours.

Intrinsically linked to CVF is the new Future Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA). After examining various candidate aircraft, the UK government confirmed in early 2001 that the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme best met its JCA requirement. As the only Level 1 full collaborative programme partner, the UK is contributing £1.3 billion to the JSF system development and demonstration phase. It is spending a further £600 million to address UK-specific requirements.

Following the conclusion of a competitive concept demonstration phase, Lockheed Martin's F-35 design was selected in November 2001 as the winner of the JSF competition. In September 2002 it was announced that the UK will opt for the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the F-35 in preference to the catapult-launch/arrested recovery carrier variant (CV).

In addition to the JCA, the CVF will also embark a Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) capability, and Merlin helicopters for anti-submarine warfare. Formerly known as Future Organic Airborne Early Warning, MASC is intended to operate in conjunction with FJCA providing air surveillance and airspace co-ordination. It may further evolve to support offensive air operations and land-attack co-ordination.

The Merlin helicopter, V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor and E-2C Hawkeye are regarded as the prime airframe candidates. However, the MASC acquisition programme has been complicated by its misalignment with JCA: Initial Gate for MASC is not due until March 2003 so a decision to select a STOVL carrier design would necessarily have constrained the choice of air vehicle for MASC. It was argued that predetermining the MASC solution may well preclude the most coherent and cost-effective system solution, and deliver a capability that falls short in key areas - such as supporting time-critical strike.

In keeping with the increasingly joint nature of operations, it is anticipated that other air assets will be embarked and supported aboard the CVF to suit specific operational circumstances. For example, medium- and heavy-lift helicopters could be brought aboard to participate in an evacuation and/or disaster relief operation. Alternatively, attack helicopters could be flown from the deck of CVF to provide air support to expeditionary forces.

Selection of the JSF variant to fulfil the JCA requirement was expected to represent a milestone decision since it would inform - if not condition - the carrier design and operating concept. Until that point the competing industry consortia had to follow a so-called 'twin track' approach whereby each continued to define and develop designs respectively optimised for STOVL and CV.  The decision made in September to adopt the STOVL F-35B for JCA, but utilise a STOVL'ised variant of the CTOL carrier design, allowed the teams to focus on one design without completely eliminating non-STOVL aircraft/helo's from future consideration for operation from the new carriers.

Lockheed Martin currently estimates the unit cost for both the CV and STOVL JSF variants at between $40 million and $50 million. Historically, the USN has planned to buy 480 CV aircraft as a highly survivable carrier-based strike fighter to complement the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Featuring a larger wing, tail surfaces and increased internal fuel capacity, the carrier variant will have a range of 600nm (1,112km), and a weapons/fuel 'bring back' payload of 8,900 lb (4,036kg).

For its part, the US Marine Corps (USMC) has projected to buy 609 STOVL variants to replace its existing AV-8B Harrier II fleet for close air support and F/A-18 Hornets for day/night attack and air superiority. Using a shaft-driven lift fan, it will have an unrefuelled range of 450nm, and a 'bring back' payload of 5,000 lb.

Few expect the respective CV and STOVL numbers to hold firm as debates continue within the USN and USMC over the future balance of navy and marine aviation. While the USMC for the past decade has advocated a transition to an all-STOVL strike-fighter force, some senior USN aviators foresee the Marine Corps flying both CV and STOVL F-35 variants, a suggestion not discounted by senior USMC officers at the Farnborough 2002 airshow.  This could see the USMC's STOVL buy pegged back to fewer than 300 aircraft. However, AM Sir Jock Stirrup, UK Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Equipment Capability), refuted suggestions that the STOVL variant could be cancelled outright in recent testimony to the House of Commons Defence Committee.

UK planning assumptions for JCA have been predicated around a purchase of 150 aircraft (replacing Sea Harrier FA.2s and Harrier GR.7/9s operated by Joint Force Harrier) at an estimated cost of between £7 billion and £10 billion. Early withdrawal of the Sea Harrier FA.2 in 2006 is expected to see numbers revised downwards: the final total will depend on the choice of variant, and a wider analysis of future offensive air needs.

To reduce costs and free aircraft for other commitments, the maximum size airgroup will not usually be carried in peacetime, instead core airgroup components will be supplemented as required.  Rather than maintaining large and permanently formed Carrier Air Group's (e.g. the CVW's embarked by USN aircraft carriers), the concept of a Tailored Air Group (TAG) will be adopted for CVF, with the exact types and numbers of aircraft embarked being adjusted to meet current requirements and threats.  The TAG will normally consist of three core components:

• Future Joint Combat Aircraft (CJA) - a new supersonic multi-role fixed wing aircraft to be operated by a combined RN/RAF "Joint Force 2000", the STOVL variant of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has been selected for this role.

• AugustaWestland EH101 Merlin HM.1 anti-submarine helicopters

• Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC)- a new generation AEW airborne platform

But in addition other British military aviation assets compatible with carrier operation could be embarked if needed, e.g. army WAH-64 attack helicopters, RAF Chinook HC.2 and Merlin HC.3 troop carrying helicopters, and uninhabited air vehicles (UAV's), etc.

Under current plans a typical embarked TAG will consist of a two squadron Joint Air Wing of F-35B fighters (totalling 24 aircraft), a squadron of 6 Merlin ASW helicopters and a flight of 4 AEW aircraft/helicopters.  It seems likely that one or two Sea-Air Rescue (SAR) plane guard helicopters and a single Carrier-On-board-Delivery (COD) aircraft/helicopter may also be attached to the carrier.  A third F-35 squadron with 12 more aircraft will be embarked if necessary.  Ideally the hanger space will be adequate for accommodating all aircraft, considerably aiding serviceability, however the embarkation of a third F-35 squadron during "surges" will necessitate the use of a permanent flight deck park.

A model of one of the concept designs for a  CVF STOVL carrier.

At the front of the ship is a control room with the ski-jump above it.  Both the Lockheed JSF and the now defunct Boeing JSF design can be seen on deck, along with FOAEW V-22 Osprey's and Merlin HM.1's.

The official in-service date for the JCA will be late 2012, when the tenth aircraft is scheduled for delivery.  However, the first operational squadron will not be ready for deployment until about 2014.  It therefore seems possible that the first CVF will initially operate with an airgroup including Harrier GR.9's.

The MASC is a new Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft intended to replace the existing Sea King AEW.7 helicopter.  The two main options being considered seem to be an AEW version of the EH 101 Merlin helicopter and an AEW version of the Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft are also being considered.  Officially the extant Northrop Grumman E-2C Hawkeye 2000 is also still an option, although this would requite the ships to complted with a catapult and arrestor gear. Selection of MASC system is not expected to be announced until the MASC Main Gate approval, scheduled for 2006, with the aircraft entering service about 2012.

CVF Construction

A major problem that's been facing the competing Prime Contractors for the future aircraft carrier - BAE Systems and Thales Naval - is where exactly they will build the new aircraft carriers.  The government has repeatedly stated that they will be constructed and out-fitted in the UK, but there are now few, if any, UK shipyards currently with the capacity, facilities, and requisite design and construction skills for a project of this size. 

As part of their ongoing assessment work for CVF, both BAE Systems and Thales conducted a thorough review of all UK shipyard facilities, addressing yard suitability, construction/access limitations and the overall cost-effectiveness of potential build strategies. 

By 2000 five main UK shipyards with the potential capacity to participate in the build of the vessels had been identified. These were Harland and Wolff in Belfast, Swan Hunter on Tyneside, the former Cammell Laird yard at Birkenhead and the BAE Systems' yards at Govan and Barrow-in-Furness.  Depending upon on the carrier design and the method of construction, other UK yards were not totally ruled out.

Some of these yards faced potential build limitations in terms of draught, length or beam restrictions, or in the means of construction employed locally, or have access restrictions that could prevent whole-ship construction.  Moreover, Cammell Laird went in to receivership in April 2001, although now owned by A&P Group the future of the Birkenhead yard beyond a limited ship repair capability remains uncertain, while Harland and Wolff also faces continuing financial difficulties.  Also, neither of these two yards has any recent warship construction experience and due to lack of orders much of their shipbuilding facilities have been retained on a care-and-maintenance basis only and their skilled workforce has been drastically reduced.

In July 2002 a report by the Commons Defence Select Committee said that the DPA considered that the main problem related to building the CVF's was of securing sufficient labour capacity in the shipyards at that time.  There are very few issues relating to facilities, other than modernising.  To assemble a modular Future Carrier, CDP identified three likely candidates with an infrastructure large enough for its final assembly — Harland & Wolff in Belfast, Inchgreen on the Clyde and the former Cammell Laird yard in Birkenhead. They also understand that Swan Hunter are also developing a large dry-dock which will be able to accommodate the vessel, and that Rosyth Dockyard are working on similar plans.

No final decision on shipyard selection is likely before the Demonstration and Manufacture contract is award in 2004, but by October 2002 both BAE and Thales had announced their likely approach to building the new carriers.  With no single UK shipyard able to build carriers of CVF size without, at the very least, major risks to cost and build schedule, both prime contractor contenders are proposing modular, multi-yard build strategies.

While collectively acknowledging the benefits of reduced cost and risk, build concurrency and increased scope for competition, each team is pressing the individual merits of its chosen solution. They are also acutely aware of the continued socio-economic - and hence political - impact attached to shipbuilding jobs nationwide. CVF is expected to provide direct employment for about 4,000 workers in the industry.

BAE Systems' Build Approach

If BAE Systems won an order for one or both carriers it would have a problem in that none of its own BAE Systems Marine shipyards have an existing slipway long enough for building a "whole ship" CVF hull.

BAE thus plan to adopt a modular construction approach, with multiple shipyards (its own Govan and Scotstoun shipyards, plus Vosper Thornycroft's new yard at Portsmouth, Ferguson's of Port Glasgow, and Babcock at Rosyth) constructing and fitting out modules which would then be moved to and assembled at one yard.  In March 2002 Mark Kane, managing director for the BAE Systems CVF bid noted: 'The modular approach has a lot of economic arguments for it as well as social benefits. Because it's so large I can see three shipyards at the very least participating.  We're taking a UK view on shipyard resourcing.'

The BAE Systems baseline plan foresees CVF construction from four (now changed to three) 'mega-blocks' plus an island block (Source: BAE Systems)

Although still undergoing refinement, BAE Systems' baseline plans now envisage the CVF's being assembled from three, pre-outfitted 'mega-blocks' (worth up to £300 million each!) built up to hanger deck level, while the hanger sides, flight deck and a separate island block complete the build plan.  This is a change from previous plans for four or even five mega-blocks.

"We sent out a request for information at the start of June [2002] to ask each yard which section they would prefer to build," says Stewart. "The responses are due back in mid-August, and that will give us a much better view on facilities, resources and capacity."

He adds: "We want to achieve maximum value for money, but that does not necessarily mean competing everything. It might perhaps mean some form of allocation to match the capabilities, resources and cost bases of certain yards."

BAE Systems announced on 29 October 2002 more details of its shipbuilding strategy for the CVF programme.  A non-exclusive agreement has been signed between the BAE Systems Prime Contract Office in Bristol, Swan Hunter in Newcastle, VT (Vosper Thornycroft) Shipbuilding on the South Coast, Babcock BES in Rosyth and BAE Systems Sea Systems Group in Barrow-in-Furness and on the Clyde for the design and build of the CVF ship platforms.

The Agreement details the principles by which the team will work together to design, procure, manufacture and trial the warships. Additionally, each of the shipyards has worked with BAE Systems to develop a detailed production plan for a significant section of the carrier platform. 

A team led by the BAE Systems Prime Contract office, with the involvement of the shipbuilding partners, will manage the final assembly of the Future Carriers. Rosyth in Scotland has been selected as the preferred final assembly site for the two giant vessels. The final assembly activity will be undertaken in the main by the workforce from both Babcock BES in Rosyth and BAE Systems on the Clyde. Inchgreen on the Clyde will remain a backup site, to ensure that a risk mitigation option is available.

The ship platform design work will be undertaken primarily on the Clyde, utilizing design staff from around the UK. This further builds on the current multi-yard design team already in place for the Type 45 destroyer program. As both this program and the Astute design program begin to ramp down, the resource will be moved into the existing BAE Systems Carrier design center at Scotstoun, ensuring continuity of skills, jobs and processes.

BAE Systems estimates, from data provided by the warship organizations and the supply chain, that the Future Carrier program will sustain in excess of 10,000 jobs in the UK between 2006 and 2015.

Thales' Build Approach

As a French-owned company competing for a key UK warship project, Thales is widely seen as the underdog in the competition to build the new carriers.  At first sight there is an even bigger potential handicap: the fact that the company does not even own a UK shipyard.  But Thales argues that the lack of its own shipyards is no bar, designing and building the ship is primarily an exercise in systems integration rather than shipbuilding; the hull will represent only a third of the total cost.  

Since 1999 British newspapers have repeatedly reported that if Thales Naval won an order for one or both of the carriers it wants to build the hulls in French shipyards, probably Chantiers de l'Atlantique at Saint-Nazaire - and that Thales allegedly has promised the MOD considerable cost savings if allowed to do this.  However the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, has insisted that a Thales victory in the battle against the BAE Systems consortium will not result in either of the two CVFs being built in France, and by early 2002 Thales appeared to accept this policy decision, Thales Naval managing director Peter Robertson saying: "The hull will be 100 per cent designed and built in the UK".  He added that the company was talking to all the UK shipyards - even BAE's - as it developed its design. 'These are very substantial ships using technologies that haven't been applied in the UK before. No single shipyard has the capability or facilities to build the whole thing on time and to cost.  Many have relatively few people on their books.  Each shipyard says it can go out and get the people it needs, but can we be sure?".  

Thales thus is proposing a build strategy that leverages the Superblock modular construction approach developed by Halliburton KBR. "This is not a traditional way to build warships but is quite commonplace in the offshore industry and in merchant shipbuilding," says Robertson. "So while the Superblock concept is new in the naval environment, it is certainly not unproven."

Thales Naval announced in April 2002 how it intends to construct the CVF's if it won the order.  Under the Thales strategy, each CVF will be assembled from five separate sections called "Superblocks" (each 5,000-16,000 tons and worth up to £200 million) contiguous with ship damage-control sections (to minimise interconnections).  Each block will be self-contained and 80-90% pre-outfitted before being transferred by sea to a dry dock for final 'hook-up'.   As each "Superblock" will be fully outfitted, a ‘virtual ship’ will be created that can be hooked-up to its adjacent partners to form the complete ship within a couple of months in dry-dock.  This process will be co-ordinated by the Thales team member Halliburton KBR (formerly Kellogg Brown & Root), part of the American owned Halliburton group.

Thales and Halliburton KBR have signed an agreement to be founder members of a shipbuilding alliance, which will be subcontracted for ship construction activities. "Halliburton KBR will lead the ship construction aspect of the programme," says Robertson. "They will be the co-ordinating authority to take these blocks from various yards, and then assemble and integrate the sections."

Thales’ baseline strategy plans include involving Swan Hunter of Newcastle, BAE Systems Marine in Glasgow, Harland and Wolff of Belfast and Vosper Thornycroft of Portsmouth in the building of the "Superblocks" for the 50,000-tonne vessels.  Harland and Wolff as well as Swan Hunter have engineers contributing to the design concept in Thales’ new prime contracting office in Bristol.  As of October 2002, the full list of the companies that have shown interest in competing for the Superblocks sections is: BAE Systems Marine, Govan; Babcock BES, Rosyth; Harland & Wolff, Belfast; Heerema, Hartlepool; KBR Caledonia Ltd, Nigg; McNulty Offshore Ltd, South Sheilds; Swan Hunter Shipbuilding, Wallsend/Port Clarence; and Vosper Thornycroft, Portsmouth.

To optimise costs, each competing shipbuilder will provide the same segment(s) for the two ships.  Mr Robertson said the MoD had stipulated that every aspect of the programme must be open to competition, as would the construction of each block.  "To optimise costs, each competing shipbuilder will provide the same segment for the two ships. We are still examining a number of candidate sites for 'hook-up', although final work-up and commissioning is planned at DML in Plymouth," Robertson says.

The Thales-led team is proposing a Superblock concept, which has proved a success in the offshore and merchant shipbuilding environment (Source: Thales CVF Team)

The internal layout of Thales CVF.  Note the widely separated enginerooms with exhaust to funnels in both islands.

Thales claims that while such a modular approach might be unusual in shipbuilding, at least in the UK, it's common in the offshore industry and can be done effectively provided that the ship is designed on this basis from the start.  And Halliburton KBR has exactly the required core expertise. The Chief Executive Officer of Thales Plc, Alex Dorrian, commented: “Thales is adapting the expertise from Halliburton KBR’s well proven commercial and offshore processes and applying it, for the first time, to the large scale construction of warships.  The new skills and ship construction techniques incorporated into Thales team, will move naval ship construction into a new era, creating an efficient and capable industry that can compete in the world marketplace.”

Peter Robertson said the company had considered several sites for assembling the "superblocks" into ships - but no single UK shipyard was suitable without modification, Harland and Wolff in Belfast and Swan Hunter on the Tyne were possible sites, as well as the Nigg Bay yard on the Cromarty Firth, near Aberdeen.  Nigg opened in 1972 to build offshore platforms during the North Sea oil boom, it is not allowed under terms of a government loan to build self-propelled vessels, but unpowered superblocks would not fall in this category.

The Nigg shipyard is owned and operated by Halliburton Caledonian KBR, another part of the Halliburton group.  The Nigg yard has one of Europe's largest docks and according to a Halliburton source "Nigg is big enough for us to be working on both carriers at the same time".   

On October 30 2002 the Thales CVF (future aircraft carrier) team announced more details about its CVF proposal.  Under the revised Thales strategy, the vessels will be UK designed, built and assembled in 5 major Superblock sections from across the UK, 8 companies are on the bidders list to compete for their construction. The Nigg and also Inchgreen yards remain an option for the final 'hook-up', but Thales now favours (like BAE Systems) undertaking final assembly of the CVF's at Babcock BES in Rosyth, which already has a large and experienced work force.  In contrast Nigg currently employs just 150 people and many many more would have to be taken on if Thales wins the carrier work.  Up 10,000 workers will be involved in the construction during the peak through the 2006 to 2010 period.

The work-up and commissioning of the CVF's would be undertaken at the Devonport dockyard run by Devonport Management Limited (DML), which is also part of the Halliburton group.
 

Potential Build Problems

It should be pointed that doubts have been expressed about the modular approach being suggested for the construction of the new carriers.  Alf Young wrote in the Sunday Herald of 5 May 2002:

"... these 50,000 tonne monsters, each built at various yards around the UK coast in a series of 80% or 90% outfitted modules, each one bigger than a whole frigate, will be barged up the Clyde and joined together at the Inchgreen drydock in the east end of Greenock.

There's plenty of historic experience on the Clyde of building ships in bits and then sticking the bits together somewhere else. ...  It hasn't always been a happy experience. In the early 1980s the nationalised Scott Lithgow tried to build a semi-submersible oil rig, the Iolair, by contracting out large sections of the twin hulls as far away as Barrow. The technical difficulties that arose when the time came to put all the bits together were such that Iolair turned into a massive loss-making venture and helped tip Scott-Lithgow out of business.

The plans to build the Navy's two future carriers in this way is certainly bold. Whether it is also foolish, remains to be seen, when construction starts sometime in 2004.

Who out of two contenders -- Thales and BAE Systems -- is to be prime contractor will have been decided a year from now. ...  But both intend building in bits around the UK, before bringing them together and assembling the finished carriers at one final location. So it's a Lego-style solution whoever is chosen.

Even experienced industry insiders are deeply sceptical. I know personally one former director of a UK defence contractor who cannot believe the concept is being given MoD houseroom and a member of Wendy Alexander's Clyde Shipyards Task Force who sought reassurance that the approach is credible in engineering terms but was far from convinced by the answers he received.

I hope we doubters are proved wrong. ...  I hope the Clyde gets a major share of the carrier contracts. But given the history of shipbuilding on the river and the novelty of the construction techniques being proposed, I don't expect it to be a trouble-free experience."

A consultancy report by RAND for the MOD, "The Royal Navy's New-Generation Type-45 Destroyer: Acquisition Options and Implications" also highlighted how the 'hook-up' of the blocks will be a greater challenge with the Future Carrier than with the Type 45 destroyer.

UK Content

Thales Naval has promised that if it wins the CVF order, the design, shipbuilding, outfitting and part of the ships equipment will remain in Britain, valuing these contracts at around 50% of the total. The rest of the contracts, covering systems from combat management to radars, are expected to go overseas.

Given the high foreign participation in the rival BAE Systems team (Northrop Grumman, Alenia Marconi and Lockheed Martin) its seems unlikely that BAE will be able to promise the MOD much greater UK content than Thales.

Basing and Support

The current Invincible class carriers are home based at HM Naval Base Portsmouth.  Their refits are normally undertaken by Rosyth Royal Dockyard (operated by Babcock Rosyth Defense Ltd).  Due to their small size there are also numerous other ship repair yards around the UK that can undertake refit work on them.

In comparison, the large size of the CVF carriers is a major problem and issue.  With the proposed specification of at least 50,0000 tonnes displacement and 950ft length it will be difficult for them to routinely and safely enter and berth at either of the RN's main two naval bases, Portsmouth Naval Base and Devonport Naval Base.  Also, there is no suitable dry dock for a CVF at either base, the No.10 Dock at Devonport being restricted to ships of about 40,000 tonnes and 850 ft length, while the biggest two docks (C and D) at Portsmouth are slightly smaller (850 ft/259 m long with a 33m beam, and 840ft/256 m long respectively).  Lengthening of any of these docks, or the construction of a new dry dock, would be a major and expensive exercise.  

On 2 July 2002 it was announced that the new carriers will also be based at Portsmouth.  As part of a recent major redevelopment Portsmouth got long new jetty's, ideal for berthing CVF's.  However there are problems, it been admitted that if the new carriers exceed 45,000 tonnes - as is planned - then they will have problems entering or exiting the base except on unusually big high tides, also Portsmouth has a narrow entrance channel and the two carrier could not pass each other.  Admiral Sir Alan West, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, has said that dredging will be needed to get the new carriers into their home base of Portsmouth. 

While it should be possible to berth two CVFs in Portsmouth simultaneously, for military reasons this may not be desirable.  Options are therefore being considered to make use of an occasional stand-by berth for the high-readiness CVF that's not subject to the arrival and departure restrictions associated with Portsmouth Naval Base.  Further work on the design, operating patterns and manning are needed before a final decision can be made, although initial indications show that Southampton could provide such a facility if required.  The use of the civilian port facilities at Southampton raises additional questions about port security and access to Dockyard Fire Brigade assets which will probably cost of tens of millions of pounds to resolve.  However, Southampton is only 20 miles by road from the Portsmouth Naval Base and other RN facilities in the Portsmouth area, and it's only a few hours sailing from the Plymouth exercise areas.  Southampton also has the massive "King George V" Dock owned by A&P Group which is 1200 ft long (365 m, with a 40.3 m beam), the only other UK dry docks able to accommodate ships of over about 900 ft length are: on Merseyside the former Cammell Laird 978 ft long (298 x 42.5 m) drydock at Birkenhead, now also owned by A&P Group; at Rosyth the 1017 ft (310 x 31.4 m) No 1 Dock operated by Babcock Rosyth; and in Northern Ireland the 1100 ft (335 x 50 m) Belfast Dry Dock operated by Harland and Wolff Group.

Thales played what they hoped would be an important "added value" card with the recruitment of DML to its team in 2001.  One of DML's prime areas of expertise is the 'work-up', this is a period of technical and engineering trials, which can last two years or so, after the ship has been built and has passed its sea trials.  This is also when the aircraft are embarked and the crew is familiarised with the ship's systems - in short the process of 'turning it into a warship'. 

However in March 2002 BAE Systems established a similar tie-up up with Babcock Engineering Services, whose Babcock Rosyth company owns and operate Rosyth Royal Dockyard.  In April 2002, Murray Easton, who heads Babcock Rosyth, said the MoD was considering the yard - which already refits the navy's Invincible-class carriers - as an assembly and maintenance site for the CVF's.

Access to the Rosyth Dockyard is a problem - the Forth bridge imposing height constraints and channels will have to be dredged.  Also if the No. 1 drydock is used for CVF assembly then major modifications will be needed to the entrance of the dock to allow the entry of blocks, and the departure of the completed ship.  But undertaking this investment will place Babcock Rosyth in an excellent position to obtain a stream of valuable refit work for the entire 50 years life of the two carriers.

Part 2 of this article...
 

Last revised: 17 January, 2003