Editorial

RN Year in Review - 2003
16 February 2004

2003 proved to be another year of ups and downs for the Royal Navy.  Firstly, the Iraq War, secondly the new aircraft carrier (CVF) saga, thirdly delays to urgently needed new construction, and fourthly the spectre of big defence cuts and disposals.

The years certainly started well enough with the announcement of in January of the next stage of CVF Project.  The Thales/BMT design concept was selected, but apparently the French owned Thales UK was not regarded as a suitable Prime Contractor so that honour went to BAE Systems!  This enforced shot-gun marriage, called the "CVF Alliance", was slated by analysts as a disaster in the making but has apparently worked well so far, at least in the initial honeymoon period.  However the the MOD and DPA were were less than impressed when in June 2004 the CVF Alliance warned that it could not build two new carriers to the requirements requested by the MOD for the £2.9 billion budgeted, it would need a billion pounds more. Urgent cost saving studies commenced and at one point the size of the ships was slashed, but became increasingly apparent that the saving being achieved were often tiny in relation to the loss of capability, and squeezing everything in to the smaller hull was increasing risk (and potentially costs), also the French were not interested in the smallest designs being considered.  During 2003 it became increasingly probable that France will join the CVF Project, and this is increasingly regarded as essential if costs are to be kept near the budget.

The first few months of 2003 were dominated by the build up to the American led Operation Iraqi Freedom  and the actual war (aka Gulf War 2) itself.  The Royal Navy deployed as part of the UK's contribution, Operation Telic, the largest Task Force that it had mustered since the Falklands War over 20 year earlier. The TF was headed by the RN's flagship, the small aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal.  She was used, with moderate success, in her secondary helicopter carrier (LPH) role, rather than to operate Harrier's (Sea Harrier FA.2 and RAF Harrier GR.7's) .  Given that the USMC operated large numbers of AV-8B+ Harrier II's with great success from two USN assault ships in the relatively cool climate of March, the suspicion is that the recent decision to take the Sea Harrier out of service nearly a decade prematurely made it politically too embarrassing to use the aircraft in a wartime situation.  The Royal Navy performed its duties bravely and with great success, but as is so often the case it seemed unable to obtain the same amount of positive press coverage that the other services achieved.  Also, a worrying point was that the RN's most expensive and important "core" combat assets: it's carriers, frigates and destroyers and nuclear submarines weren't perhaps its most useful in OIF.  The RN's biggest and most cost-effective contribution was probably made by its amphibious ships, strategic sea lift, mine counter measures vessels, helicopters and the Royal Marines.

After the war the relative under-performance and lack of utility of the RN's "Cold War" era assets in relation to their cost became a major factor in the Defence Review that led to the Defence White Paper 2003, which was published in December.  Fundamental questions were asked about the number of escorts and submarines that the UK really needed in order for the Royal Navy to perform its duties, the viability of old man-power intensive Cold War designs such as the Type 42 destroyer and even the rather specialist ASW orientated Type 23 frigate, and also how many replacements had to be built - a serious question with new destroyers costing about £700 million and new nuclear submarines about £1 billion.  The Royal Navy found itself struggling to defend some of its current force levels and future plans, for example a question oft ask is whether sophisticated and costly frigates or destroyers designed to fight to World War 3 are really required for drug patrols, anti-piracy patrols, sanctions enforcement, etc., is there not a cheaper option? 

The whitepaper itself was most notable for its self-congratulatory civil service double-speak, and saying almost nothing in nearly 100 pages.  However through the fog one thing was clear, the Royal Navy faced major cuts and soon - as the year ended rumours included the loss of the three remaining Type 42 Batch 1 destroyers, the sale of two Type 23's, a reduction in the planned buy of Type 45 destroyers from 12 to perhaps as little as 8, a reduction in the number of nuclear submarines from 12 to perhaps 8, a reduction in the number of JCA fighters that will be bought from 150 to 90 (vital for CVF), etc.

The difficult situation is not helped by delays and cost over-runs to new construction.  By the start of 2003 year it was clear that BAE Systems was in desperate trouble with the Astute SSN programme, in February it was announced that the contract had been re-negotiated, the MOD will now pay hundreds of millions more and the first boat, HMS Astute, will be delayed by at least 3 years - she will not now be operational until 2009!  BAE Systems finally delivered the new LPD HMS Albion in early 2003, over a year late, her sister ship has been similarly delayed.  Two new Wave Class tankers built by BAE Systems finally entered service with the RFA in 2003, a year late.  First steel was cut for the new Type 45 destroyer HMS Daring in March 2003, but it's now obvious that BAE Systems will be unable to deliver her as promised in 2006, at least a years delay is now expected which means this badly needed replacement for the oldest Type 42's won't enter service until 2008.  Also Swan Hunter and BAE Systems are experiencing problems with the four Bay Class LSD(A) - at least a years delay is anticipated to their in service dates.  Perhaps worst of all, BAE Systems officials often cast doubt during 2003 on whether they would be able to get the first CVF carrier in to service by 2012, as the MOD was demanding.

Finally...

Feel free to contact me if you have any comments, suggestions or questions... my email address is frn@beedall.com.

But please please note that I do not have either RN service records or RN ship logs - I really can't answer questions of the form "My grandfather, John Smith, was in the Royal Navy in 1953-8.  Please send me details of his service career, the ships he served on, and the ports he visited".  Try the MoD website at http://www.mod.uk/contacts/records_rn.htm for details on how to get this type of information.  

Happy browsing,

Richard

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