Editorial

Concerns about the RN's new Assault Ships
25 August 2004

On 12 July 2004 the MOD accepted from BAE Systems the delivery of HMS Bulwark, the last of two Landing Platform Dock’s (LPD) built to replace HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid in the Assault Ship role.

A £449 million contract for the Design, Build and Initial Support of HM Ships Albion and Bulwark was originally placed with VSEL (later BAE SYSTEMS Marine Ltd) in July 1996.  Both Albion and Bulwark were constructed as a series of large block modules in the BAE Systems Devonshire Dock Hall in Barrow-in-Furness.

Based at Devonport, the two ships are among the most technologically advanced in the world, and there is no doubting their ability to operate as specialist amphibious lift and landing ships.  Thanks to their state-of-the-art combat, communication and command support systems, the Albion class are also able to exercise command and control of the landing operations, acting as the afloat command platform for the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and the naval Task Group Commander (CTG) and Commander Landing Force (CLF) while embarked.  However these undoubted capabilities and qualities are marred by serious concerns about their standard of construction, and the potential effect that this has on them as fighting “warships”.

The two LPD's marked a return to surface warship construction at Barrow after 15 years concentrating solely on submarines - with the exception of the final outfitting of HMS Ocean.  While the shipyard had most of the necessary facilities, its staff was largely unprepared for the challenges of building modern warships.  The construction work was allegedly very disorganised because the management at Barrow simply did not have the necessary project skills and experience, and the workforce was also inadequately skilled and unmotivated – the later not helped by the knowledge that many of them were likely to be made redundant when the ships completed.  The ships were finally delivered about 19 months later than planned, and costs had ballooned to about £790 million.

Although the ships now finally proudly fly the white ensign, outstanding concerns remain about their build quality.  So much rework has been required, and so many defects were identified by crew members during acceptance testing and contractor trials, that wags refer to them as "the ships that were built twice".  Just some of the problems identified included:

• Lack of segregation of cabling.
• Serious errors in relation to the installation of piping.
• Improper repair of damaged cables.
• Defective penetration of bulkheads.
• Defective welding of main bulkheads.
• Lack of strengthening from the bridge downwards, through the magazine areas, causing distortion of bulkheads.
• Deficiencies in the Medical Centre.
• Hatches incorrectly fitted.
• A general low standard of workmanship.

It is clear that inadequate quality control was enforced at all stages, both by the builders and by the 30-50 strong MOD project team.  

The question can reasonably be asked:  Why did the government and MOD and DPA fail to impose tighter inspections standards and controls during construction, and why did the RN accept delivery of the ships given their poor material condition? 

An excessive separation between customer and supplier was undoubtedly part of the problem – in recent years the MOD has changed its equipment procurement processes considerably, placing far more onus upon the supplier to deliver what it promised without close supervision.  What ever the theoretical advantages of the new approach, in practice it allows major problems to develop in a project and remain hidden for years.

Perhaps another reason was the intense pressure that developed to get these new ships in service, which resulted in lowered standards and shortcuts being accepted.  In November 2001, as the “War on Terrorism” heated up, the MOD asked BAE Systems to do all that it could to expedite the delivery of HMS Bulwark, and the pressure increased even further when HMS Fearless was unexpectedly and prematurely paid-off in March 2002, leaving the RN with no Assault Ship in service.  Inevitably the project team and crew may have felt increasingly obliged to sign-off rather than enforce requests for recertification work that would have caused more delays. HMS Albion was finally delivered in April 2003, entering service later that year.

Those familiar with both the new ships and their predecessors believe that physically the Albion class ships have a much lower degree of robustness and survivability than the Fearless class which they have replaced, one source claiming that they are basically just civilian RoRo ferries painted grey, rather than true warships.  It is also implied that many recommendations and standards established after the Falklands War of 1982 have not been followed or ignored for these new ships, one RN source suggesting on condition of anonymity that "These ships cannot be fought".

However on the positive side, both the MOD and BAE Systems have learnt many valuable lessons from the LPD(R) saga.  The management problems caused by inexperience, disconnectedness and lack of oversight have been identified and hopefully solved. Continuous inspections, improved quality control of materials, and better segregation are just some measures re-introduced or now better enforced.  Also BAE Systems has decided to discontinue surface ship construction at Barrow, plans to construct Type 45 blocks there were dropped in January 2003 and the yard will again concentrate exclusively on submarines.

The benefits of the new measures are apparently already being felt with the Type 45 destroyer build, and the DPA plans to take an even more pro-active “hands-on” role in relation the new aircraft carriers (CVF).  But the crews of HMS Albion and Bulwark, and the taxpayer, have had to pay a high price – which may one day become even higher.

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