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A Recent History of the Royal Navy

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The RN in AD2012?  HMS Albion (top-left), Ocean (top-right), Emerald (bottom-left) and a new escort (bottom-right) in action

1960-1989

The Royal Navy changed slowly but surely between the 1960's and the 1980's. In the 1960's it was still the world's second largest navy and was meeting its global responsibilities with the operation of a significant force of five medium-size conventional fixed-wing (CTOL) aircraft carriers, all capable of substantial power projection. It had also been assigned at the Anglo-American Nassau agreement of 1962 with the responsibility of providing Britain's nuclear deterrent and a very successful crash program to build Resolution Class SSBN's armed with Polaris ICBM's was launched.

The nature of the Royal Navy completely changed when in the 1966 defence cuts the Labour government cancelled the Royal Navy's new large carrier programme and ordered that all the existing carriers be scrapped by 1971.  Although one carrier, HMS Ark Royal was given a temporary reprieve and lasted until 1978, this made no significant difference to the overall direction of defence policy.  In the 1970's as the RN became smaller and its last conventional aircraft carriers de-commissioned it evolved in to a specialist anti-submarine force, emphasising its NATO defined North Atlantic role. By the 1980's the RN's spending was concentrated on small helicopter carriers (also capable of operating a small number of Harrier VSTOL aircraft), escorts and nuclear-powered hunter-killer (SSN) submarines - all with a primary anti-submarine mission.  In 1981 Mr (now Sir) John Knott in a still infamous Defence White Paper announced his response to the massive recent increases in the size of the Soviet Navy -  massive naval cuts for the RN!  His plans included the sale of the small but brand new VSTOL harrier-carrier HMS Invincible to Australia, and the two Fearless Class LPD's to Argentina.   The brief, but violent, war with Argentina in 1982 over the Falklands Islands got rid of Knott, but caused only a temporary reversal of some of these cuts.  The only lasting outcome of the war was a recognition that the RN needed to retain at least a minimal carrier and amphibious capability.

Early Post-Cold War Period

After unexpected the fall of the soviet block around 1990, the over-riding priority for the RN remained its provision of the UK's nuclear deterrent, and a hugely expensive programme to build four new Vanguard Class submarines armed with Trident II missiles was authorised in the early 1980's.  

Other than this deterrent role, the fall of the of the Soviet block about and the associated disintegration of the Soviet/Russian Navy since about 1991 saw a radical review of the Royal Navy's role. This was unfortunately combined with a painful reduction in the RN's budget by one third in real terms since 1990, as the UK Treasury claimed its "peace-dividend" with further massive Defence cuts, starting with the ill-named "Options for Change" in 1990.  These cuts were in the context of what proved to be in many ways (e.g. Iraq, Yugoslavia) a more unsettled world.  There seemed therefore to be a greater likelihood than for many years of the UK armed forces being involved in crisis's around the world, probably in conjunction with the UN, NATO or other allies. The RN thus began changing its emphasis from North Atlantic operations and anti-submarine warfare to what used to be called "out of area" (i.e. outside the North Atlantic) operations.

By 1992, after its primary deterrent role the RN had identified three core capabilities to which it has since given priority. These were:

  1. Amphibious Forces
  2. SSN Nuclear Attack Submarines
  3. Aircraft Carriers

To free resources to invest in these areas at a time of massively declining defence spending the RN's senior commanders had to make some very difficult choices and sacrifice assets and numbers. The six years 1992-97 saw the RN close many bases and other shore facilities and lose 33% of its uniformed strength (from 62,400 at 1 January 1992 to 41,368 at 1 June 1997). Also during this period:

  • The surface frigate/destroyer escort force declined from 45 ships to 35.
  • The nuclear submarine (SSN) force reduced from about 15 boats to 12, including the decommissioning of HMS Swiftsure in 1992 after only 19 years service.
  • The conventional submarine (SSK) force was completely eliminated with the decommissioning of the remaining Oberon units and the lease of 4 brand-new Upholder's to Canada.
  • The Minesweeper/Minehunter forbe was halved, with the loss of the remaining Ton Class units and the RNR operated River class EDATS units.
  • Replacements for the aging but hard-worked Type 42 Batch 1 destroyers were postponed.

Current Operational Concept

It was announced in July 1998 as part of the Strategic Defence Review that the Royal Navy will have a new operational concept for maritime forces, as a key enabler in joint operations alongside the Army and RAF.  This is known as the Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations.

Under this concept, maritime forces will:

  • play a key role in the new Joint Rapid Reaction Forces;
  • make maximum use of the Navy's inherent mobility and flexibility, together with our ability to deploy early and operate independently of shore support;
  • provide an amphibious force, reinforced when required by Army tanks, armoured vehicles and attack helicopters;
  • deploy joint combat air power from all three Services using fixed wing aircraft and attack and support helicopters;
  • provide, support and defend the sealift vessels required to sustain operations of all kinds;
  • help to deter conflict and forestall crises where possible and;
  • when required, support the movement of land and air forces ashore throughout the subsequent campaign.

This will be achieved through:

  • a renewed commitment to an amphibious brigade as a highly trained and ready force, with better equipment including armoured all terrain vehicles, heavier artillery and weapon locating radar;
  • a major commitment to improved amphibious shipping, including the helicopter carrier HMS OCEAN, roll-on/roll-off ships, landing ships logistic and the two landing platforms dock, HMS ALBION and HMS BULWARK;
  • plans for the procurement of two larger aircraft carriers, able to operate fixed-wing aircraft and the full spectrum of defence helicopters;
  • fitting all attack submarines to be able to operate the Tomahawk land attack missile;
  • continued reliance on modern frigates and destroyers, whose flexibility allows a wide range of employment in operations of all kinds;
  • continuing investment in mine countermeasures to enable us to undertake force projection in littoral waters;
  • a shift of emphasis towards joint training with land and air force units, particularly as part of the new Joint Rapid Reaction Forces.

In this new operational concept, aircraft carriers have even greater importance in many scenarios. They offer a secure base of operations under national control, and have proved to be enormously effective on many occasions in recent years (e.g. Falklands, Bosnia, Hong Kong withdrawal, and the Arabian Gulf stand-offs with Iraq).   Embarrassingly for the RAF, its long-held claims that air bases in friendly countries for its aircraft will always be available for any British military operation - therefore making expensive RN Arcraft Carriers quite unnecessary - has now been repeatedly disproved.  Indeed, RAF GR7 Harriers have had to regularly operate from the RN's aircraft carriers.

Emphasising this, the Defence Secretary - Mr George Robertson - said in March 1998: "Our existing small aircraft carriers have proved useful in post-Cold War crises in tasks for which they were not designed. We are considering whether, if we do acquire new carriers, they should be larger than the current generation in order to operate a wider range of aircraft in a greater number of roles."

UK Strategic Defence Review - July 1998

The UK Labour Government's Strategic Defence Review was published on 8 July 1998.  Despite pressure from the Treasury bottom-line budget cuts were limited to £685 million from the previous £22 billion.  Within the review there is a significant re-alignment of the British armed forces from fighting major wars to providing for more flexible joint rapid reaction forces capable of intervening in crises around the world.

As expected the news for the RN was mixed, it is worth quoting here part of the Defence Secretary's - Mr George Robertson - statement:

" ... For the RN - The emphasis will move from large scale open-ocean warfare to force projection and littoral operations in conjunction with the other two Services, with a premium on versatility and deployability.  We will match the front line more closely to today's requirements so that manpower can be used to maximum effect where it is really needed.  To that end, we are:

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  • Planning to procure two large aircraft carriers, capable of operating up to 50 fixed wing aircraft and helicopters from all three services at one time (compared with a maximum of 24 aircraft now),which will give us a new, potent and flexible maritime capability to project power. This will give us a fully independent ability to deploy a powerful combat force to potential trouble spots without waiting for basing agreements on other countries territory. We will be able to be poised in international waters and most effectively back up diplomacy with the threat of force.
  • Strengthening support to our brigade-sized amphibious force (5,000 troops), by acquiring an additional 4 RoRo container ships to add to the existing two (Sea Chieftain and Sea Crusader). This is in addition to our new helicopter carrier (HMS Ocean), the two replacement Landing Platforms Dock (Albion and Bulwark) and two replacement Landing Ships Logistic.
  • Making all Trafalgar class submarines capable of firing our 1,000 mile range Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, thereby extending our ability to apply pressure, for example to coerce rogue regimes to comply with international and UN requirements. We have confirmed existing plans to modernise our attack submarine force by purchasing five Astute class; two more will be ordered early in the new century to join the three already on order.
  • Maintaining plans to modernise the destroyer and frigate force with a new class of Common New Generation Frigates [Webmaster - since cancelled!].
  • Increasing numbers in the Royal Naval Reserve by 350, to 3,850 ...
  • Reflecting changed requirements by making small reductions in the size of our attack submarine (12 to 10), surface escort (35 to32) and mine countermeasure forces (18 to 22 instead of 25)  ... "

Other significant points of the SDR affecting the RN include:

  • The number of nuclear warheads on each Trident submarine is to be reduced from 96 to 48.
  • The number of  Trident missiles purchased will be reduced from 65 to 58.
  • No further Merlin helicopters will to be ordered beyond the current 44.  This will require more Lynx's to be upgraded to Mark 8 and some Sea King Mk6 will not be replaced.
  • RN Harrier FA.2 and RAF Harrier GR.7 forces are to be integrated in a "Joint Force 2000" programme.
  • Anti-ship role RAF Tornado's are to be withdrawn from service.
  • No further cuts in RN manpower are planned.

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 © 2004-10 Richard Beedall unless otherwise indicated.