Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA)

(formally the Future Joint Combat Aircraft - FJCA,
 formally the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft - FCBA)

Part 1

FCBA/JCA Artists Impressions

JSF Preferred Weapon System Concept

Project designation: Joint Combat Aircraft, URD 6464 Issue ?
Status: Main Gate approval January 2001, in equivalent of Demonstration and Manufacture Phase
In Service Date: Officially December 2014 , but expected to be delayed until 2017

Notes:

The "Joint Combat Aircraft" (JCA) project originated as a Sea Harrier replacement "Future Carrier Borne Aircraft" (FCBA) program to provide the fleet with a new fighter and attack aircraft to succeed the Sea Harrier from 2012.  The JCA project is concurrent with plans for a Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) to replace the Invincible Class aircraft carriers.

On 17 January 2001 it was announced that the Joint Strike Fighter has been selected to meet the UK's FCBA requirement.  On 26 October 2001 it was announced that Lockheed Martin had won the Prime Contract to develop the Joint Strike Fighter, now designated the F-35. The F-35B STOVL variant was officially selected for JCA in September 2002, but has regularly been reconsidered and final decision is awaited,

Since 2001 the MOD has regularly stated an intent to buy up to 150 JCA's at a cost of about ₤8 billion, however the United Kingdom is currently (late 2006) expected by Lockheed Martin to buy about 138 of the F-35 Lightning II, over the period 2011-2027.  About 80 of these will be the F-35B short take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) variant -and intended to meet the Joint Combat Aircraft requirement as a replacement for the recently upgraded Harrier GR.9 and the already out of service Sea Harrier FA.2 in RAF and RN service.  The remainder of the planned UK buy (of an unknown JSF variant, but probably the F-35C) was apparently re-assigned in 2006 to form the manned element of a successor deep strike capability to replace the RAF's Tornado GR.4.against its Future Combat Air Capability (FCAC) requirement.

Regardless of variant, the first two or three UK aircraft are expected to be delivered in 2011/12 for trials purposes.  Official entry in to service was originally 2012 but was delayed until 2014 by technical problems, budget shortfalls resulted in the MOD's Equipment Plan 2007 (EP2007) further delaying the in-service date to 2017 to reduce budgetary pressures. The first deployment of an operational squadron on CVF is likely around the turn of that decade,

Project History

The Requirement
Studies in to possible replacements for the Sea Harrier can be traced back to the late 1970's.  The original Sea Harrier FRS.1 only entered service in 1980 but even before then the RN was already very conscious of the three deficiencies that would haunt the aircraft for its whole service life - sub-sonic performance, inadequate range, and limited payload.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of studies were done by industry in the late 1970s and 1980's against Air Staff Target AST.410 (a Mach 2 V/STOL fighter for the RN & RAF) and later Naval Staff Target NST.6464 (Sea Harrier replacement) - but their proposals came to nothing. 

In 1981 the UK ditched a proposed British Aerospace "big wing" development of the Harrier in favour of a variant of the McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier design, which became the Harrier GR.5 in RAF service - the decision causing considerable controversy at the time given that McDonnell Douglas had licensed the earlier AV-8A Harrier designed from the UK's Hawker Siddeley (by then part of British Aerospace).  After this deal co-operation with the USA increasingly seemed the most realistic and affordable approach for a Harrier replacement, and in the early 1990's the two countries worked on developing an  Advanced Short Take Off and Landing (ASTOVL) experimental technology demonstrator.  In 1994 this project was merged by the Americans into their Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) Program, and in October 1994 the UK agreed to fund 35% of the ASTOVL element of JAST.

In 1996 the UK began the formal procurement process to examine options for a Future Carrier Borne Aircraft  as Staff Target (Sea/Air) 6464, later URD 6464.  Continuing right up to the end of 2000, the MoD conducted various Feasibility Studies into its options for meeting the RN's Future Carrier Borne Aircraft (FCBA) requirement for a Sea Harrier replacement, flying from the Invincible Class carriers and its replacement platform - the  Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF).  The CVF design would be greatly affected by the selection of aircraft to fly from the vessel and therefore no detailed design work could really start until FCBA/JCA had been selected, i.e. due to its longer lead times the JCA project had to more advanced than the CVF programme.

The FCBA was required to operate in all weathers, with an ability to fly day and night missions, for air defence of the fleet and of ground forces. It had to be capable of providing offensive air action and to be able to support long range air interdiction, as well as anti-surface warfare and tactical reconnaissance. Key attributes of the FCBA in comparison to the then current Sea Harrier FA2 and Harrier GR7 included the need for it to be supersonic and to have improved survivability and supportability.  The aircraft was also required to have increased range relative to the current Sea Harrier and to be able to support internal and external weapon carriage.

The FCBA project became the combined RN/RAF Future Joint Combat Aircraft (FJCA) in January 2001, now expected to replace RAF Harriers as well as RN Sea Harriers.  The word "Future" was dropped in January 2003 and the project became known as simply the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA).

In January 2002 it was announced that the MOD wasn't able to fund the upgrades necessary to keep the Sea Harrier FA.2 fighter in service as to 2015 as previously planned, and instead the type left service in March 2006.  One former front-line Sea Harrier Squadron (800 Naval Air Squadron) was commissioned 31 March  2006, re-equipped with 9 Harrier GR.7 and GR.9 Harrier's, and will occasionally fly these from HMS Illustrious (HMS Invincible having left service, and HMS Ark Royal has been re-rolled as an LPH amphibious ship).  Another ex-Sea Harrier squadron, 801 NAS was expected to commission in October 2006 but this was foiled by a lack of naval pilots, and the target date is now 2010.  Instead a Naval Strike Wing was formed in March 2007, which officially comprises of elements of both 800 and 801 Squadrons - although this is still  equivalent in strength to just one 9 aircraft squadron, rather than the two originally planned.

It is currently expected that the Harrier will be withdrawn from service around 2019, replaced by the JCA, but this is subject to review and extension in the event of further delays to JCA.

Carrier Operation Options

The greatest single factor affecting the FCBA/JCA selection was the need for maritime operations from aircraft carriers.  There are a number of methods by which the new aircraft could be launched from aircraft carriers, all of which aim to optimise costs, runway size and aircraft capability in a given design.  The contenders for FJCA could be grouped in to three basic launch/landing cycle methods:

The two possible STOVL type JCA aircraft considered were an advanced derivative of the current Harrier design, and the STOVL variant of the new Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) which is currently under development.

With a new version of the Harrier an unattractive option and effectively ruled out, JSF was always considered by far the leading contender for meeting the FCBA/FJCA requirement.  Three major versions of the JSF are planned, one for each for the US Air Force, US Navy and US Marine Corps.  The USMC variant will will be STOVL capable and is therefore always an attractive choice for the RN and RAF.  The UK is a full partner in this US lead project, and about 3,000 airframes are eventually expected to purchased by the US and the UK.  

A lot more information on JSF can be found further below.

CTOL
Another possible launch method for JCA aircraft was Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL).  In this method aircraft take-off's are catapult-assisted, allowing very heavy payloads to be carried, while special arrestor gear equipment is used to halt fast moving landing aircraft in a relatively short distance.

Of the three, the JSF CV variant was much preferred.  Neither the FA-18 or Rafale options were favoured as compared to JSF they were expensive, not stealthy and their selection would offer little benefit and work to UK industry.  Rafale is faster and probably more agile than the F/A-18, but it is also a relatively unproven design with lower payload and a shorter range than the F/A-18, and it was of no interest to the RAF as a Harrier GR.7/9 replacement because of its inferior strike capabilities.  No serious consideration seems to have been given to Rafale, despite extensive French lobbying and suggestions that they might be interested in the CVF design if the UK was interested in Rafale. 

The only serious CTOL contender for JCA has always appeared to be the CV variant of JSF.  However, the F/A-18 is a proven highly capable multi-purpose aircraft specifically designed for carrier operations, and it would become a serious option if JSF is cancelled and a marinised Typhoon is not considered to be affordable or viable (as seems to be the case).

STOBAR
The third and final launch method option that was considered for JCA was a Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) aircraft.  Like STOVL, the aircraft takes off without the aid of catapults, a bow ‘ski jump’ launching ramp helping reduce the runway length.  Then, like with CTOL, arrestor gear is used to "trap" landing aircraft.

The only STOBAR aircraft type to be considered by the FCBA/JCA studies was a marinised Eurofighter Typhoon EF2000.  Initial pre-feasibility studies were undertaken in early 1996 by British Aerospace's (now BAE Systems) Military Aircraft and Aerostructures Department to consider a Eurofighter Typhoon (N) (possible service name - Sea Typhoon).  These looked promising and in 1997 a further 27 month contract was let to study in more detail both catapult-launched (CTOL) and STOBAR variants, these would have in common a strengthened undercarriage and an arrestor hook, and possibly a larger thicker wing with power folding and more powerful vectored thrust EJ200 engines.  Both variants would have required a large conventional carrier design equipped with an angled flight deck and arrested wires for landing. 

The UK was not the only potential customer for a navalised Typhoon, Eurofighter GmbH (the consortium which builds and sells Typhoon) is reported to have briefed the Italian Navy during 2000 about a low-cost, reduced weight, arrestor landing/angled deck variant of the Typhoon that could operate from the Italian Navy’s new 25,000 tonnes carrier, Conte di Cavour, which is due to enter service in 2006/7.  The company has also offered another customer (probably India) a “more radically modified naval version of the aircraft”, presumably the STOBAR variant studied for the UK. 

BAE Systems continued with varying amounts of enthusiasm (apparently depending on its likely JSF workshare at the time!) to push Typhoon (N) as an alternative to JSF, stressing the Typhoon's higher speed, range and payload, although admitting it would be less stealthy.  A Typhoon (N) would also have the advantage of considerable commonality with the 232 Eurofighter Typhoon's already planned for the RAF. 

BAE Systems suggested that costly airframe strengthening and a new undercarriage for Typhoon (N), as traditionally required for aircraft "navalisation" of a land based aircraft, could be avoided by using sophisticated computer controlled precise landing systems and other aids to reduce arrested landing stresses to within existing Typhoon limits - which are far below those currently normal for hard carrier operations.  Apparently even giant fans blowing air over the aft flight deck and in to the final landing approach were considered!  But these BAE's idea's do not seem to have been accepted by the MOD, indeed they would appear to be a rather risky cost reduction measure which have become a source of major problems in the future, e.g. preventing flight operations in heavy seas or leading to costly repairs of prematurely fatigued aircraft. 

During 1999-2000 a fully navalised STOBAR Typhoon seemed to be the only real competitor to JSF for the JCA order, but in January 2001 (just prior to the UK signing a MoU for the JSF SDD phase - see below) reports appeared in the UK press that it had been eliminated on cost and safety grounds, e.g. the flight deck clearance of external weapons was considered dangerously low for the robust nature of carrier launch and landing events, and the canards dangerously restricted the pilots view during high angle of attack carrier landings.

In May 2001 Sir Robert Walmsley, Head of the Defence Procurement Agency, when asked about the possibility of a navalised Eurofighter if JSF was cancelled said: "It is not currently designed so that it could use a carrier.  We could change the design but we would be faced with a huge piece of work.  The materials would probably have to be changed in order to avoid corrosion; the weight of the undercarriage would have to be doubled to support carrier landing which would eat into the payload margin; and the wing roots would have to be strengthened in order to take the full inertia forces on landing. That sounds to me like a very substantial redesign.  It is always possible, but it would cost a huge amount of money and it would certainly add very considerably to the cost of the aircraft".

The possibility of a navalised Typhoon re-emerged in late 2005, as "Plan B" when the UK hit severe problems in relation to technology transfer for the F-35 JSF.  Published leaks indicated that BAE engineers had concluded (presumably in the earlier studies) that navalising Typhoon appeared to be "practical and relatively inexpensive", and that navalising later RAF tranches "might be of interest".   STOBAR was considered preferable to CTOL, flight control system changes would be necessary to guarantee "precision landings" but there would be little change to structural layout, and there would certainly be no need for a major rework for the aircraft to survive arrested landings.  The view over the nose was not necessarily inadequate.  There were a number of options for reducing sink rate, only the increased angle of attack option would would require the addition of a pilot periscope or a higher seat position and higher canopy roofline.  The studies indicated a 340 kg weight increase for the STOBAR version, and 460 kg for the CTOL catapult launched variant.

The UK JSF SDD Commitment

By the end of 2000 the UK had completed its studies for meeting the [then still] FCBA requirement and had selected the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as preferred for the role.

On 17 January 2001 the United States and United Kingdom jointly signed a memorandum of understanding for the next phase of the Joint Strike Fighter program at the Pentagon.  The agreement means that at a cost of $2 billion the U.K. has become a "Level 1" partner in JSF, and taken an 8% funding share in the engineering, manufacturing and development (EMD) phase of the programme - later renamed the System Development and Demonstration (SDD).  As the programme unfolds, and depending upon the number of aircraft procured, the rate of participation by the UK may still change

Baroness Symons, U.K. Minister of State for Defense Procurement, stated after the signing the MoU: "Our commitment today to the JSF program shows that we continue to consider the JSF...as the most cost-effective means to meet our requirements" for the British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy.  But Symons would not say that signing the MOU means the U.K. has made a final decision that the JSF will its choice for the Future Carrier-Borne Aircraft (FCBA). "We are saying that, at the moment, we think it has the best potential," she said. "We haven't signed the contract - the final contract."  She said the agreement confirmed the belief in writing that the JSF "is a very strong contender" for FCBA (now JCA).  Adm Sir Nigel Essenhigh, then the First Sea Lord, also welcomed the signing saying: "This is a really exciting day for the Royal Navy and for the Fleet Air Arm. There is a very close link between the type of aircraft we buy and the type of aircraft carrier we order."

The agreement, and the unique Level 1 status it confers, allowed the UK to be part of the JSF evaluation and selection process which started on 8 February 2001, when Boeing and Lockheed Martin submitted their 'call for improvements', essentially a request for proposals, to the JSF Joint Program Office in the US Department of Defense (DoD).   The submission of the proposals triggered the start of a formal selection process that eventually saw Lockheed Martin chosen as the prime contractor to develop JSF on 26 October 2001.  The UK's stake in the voting, alongside the US Air Force, US Navy and US Marine Corps, gave it considerable influence over the winning choice.

A wild card in the process, was the new Bush administration, which decided to review all major US defence programmes, including the $200 billion JSF project.  It was also felt that significant price growth could jeopardise the entire programme as the USAF and USN are both believed to prefer building more of existing types (F-22, F16 and FA-18E/F) if the price differential reduces and JSF fails to offer substantially greater performance other than stealth. Recognising that an international programme is harder to cancel once started, the US JSF community became increasingly eager to pull the UK on board the EMD/SDD phase. This however encouraged UK industry, and BAE Systems in particular, to push in late 2000 for what observers described as an "increased qualitative slice" of the work. MoU signature was delayed by a fierce behind-the-scenes campaign by BAE and some other UK companies to convince the MoD to push the DoD for guarantees on the quality of work they will gain on JSF, particularly in the airframe and systems integration field.  The UK national workshare of the winning Lockheed Martin lead JSF programme  is now expected to be at least 15%, even though the UK MoD is only about 8% of EMD funding.  After the terrorist events in the USA of 11 September 2001, the future of JSF seemed to be politically secure.

Selection of JSF Variant for JCA

The UK's January 2001 signing of a memorandum of understanding with the US government to participate in the JSF System Development and Demonstration Phase, effectively selected JSF as the preferred solution to meet the JCA requirement.  However, a decision on whether the UK will opt for the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) JSF variant, hitherto the UK's planning assumption, or the conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) carrier variant (actually known as the JSF CV variant) is still pending.  Given that STOVL has always been strongly preferred officially, it's somewhat surprising that opinion within the MoD is now split, and the DPA is having to put an improvised mechanism in place to decide between the two JSF variants.  The suspicion is developing that the performance gap (payload/range) between the STOVL and CV JSF is proving to be much greater than previously excepted, or at least hoped.  For example, the Lockheed Martin F-35 CV variant will have a combat radius of about 1200nm, whilst its STOVL variant will have a combat radius of less than 800nm.

"The decision to be made between the STOVL and [CV]  variants will be a difficult one," said Wing Cdr Green of the FCA IPT.  "They are being viewed as equal competitors. Our final decision will be informed by the results of the current concept demonstration phase, study work to examine the UK's future offensive air capability, and a range of 'softer' issues such as our concept of operations."

One well-placed industry source reported confrontation between civilian officials against an alliance of the RAF and Royal Navy over the JSF choice. "The RAF are desperate to get a STOVL JSF selected to avoid any threat to their Eurofighter and Future Offensive Air Systems (FOAS) developing, which could undermine the projected numbers of airframes in those programmes. 

"At the same time the Royal Navy has decided not to rock the boat and is siding with the RAF in favour of the STOVL version to avoid a major row," said the source. "The people pushing a big carrier with CV versions of the JSF embarked are the civilian bean-counters who can see the cost and capability benefits of this solution."

There appeared to be a genuine split in the Royal Navy between the two choices. There’s a significant faction that can point to the simplicity and efficiency of STOVL. There’s no denying the higher sortie rates, the safer operations, the operations in a wider set of conditions and the less need for sea room.  So for sorties in the 200-400 mile range, 24 STOVLs can do the work of 36 CATOBARs for more of the time while the ship is close to land. The other faction points to Afghanistan as a model for future ops.  The USN built a short range, light strike force of F/A-18C/D Hornet’s with the theory that most targets will be close to the coast, the odd ones that are further inland can be handled by Tomahawk cruise missile, and heavy bomb loads aren’t needed anymore with the advent of PGM’s. Well for Afghanistan they were flat wrong on all three counts. If it weren’t for the RAF help in providing compatible tankers, the USN would not have been able to do much in that campaign. Without friendly nearby bases, carriers need long range, long endurance, heavy lift fighters. Compare the F-35C figures above to the old F-4 Phantom II. Interestingly enough the RN have asked Lockheed Martin to look at a tanker version of the STOVL F-35B but they might not like the answer too much. Anyway, consensus or not, the RN bottom line is very clear. They want big carriers period. What type is not the major concern so they’re not going to make waves arguing for one type vs. the other. [Editors note: Thanks to "RonO" for this analysis!]

A final down selection between the two carrier compatible F-35 variants, required in order to inform the design and operating characteristics of the Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) design, was finally announced on 30 September 2002 (nearly 2 years later than originally expected), the STOVL variant getting the decision.  Sir Alan West, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, said that the crucial reason for deciding to go for the short take-off and landing version of the JSF, while keeping open the option for a catapult system at a later stage, was that the jump-jet aircraft would be ready in time to meet the new carrier’s in-service deadline of 2012 while the conventional version of JSF would take longer to produce.  He admitted that the MoD had been forced to buy the STOVL version because a recent discovery of a USAF accounting error had led to predictions of a 2-year delay in the conventional JSF aircraft programme.

Lord Bach, the Defence Procurement Minister, said the short take-off and landing version of JSF had also been chosen because of Britain’s unique experience in flying jump-jet aircraft during nearly four decades of operations with Harrier on land and sea.

The evaluation of the two JSF variants was said by one MoD source to be "very finely balanced", the industrial interests of Rolls-Royce and BAE Systems, the RAF's leaning towards STOVL, an earlier planned in-service date (ISD) and wider balance of investment issues affecting the MoD equipment programme swung the vote in favour of the F-35B.

Yet the downselection of the STOVL variant was seen as premature by some in the MoD and the RN and it is understood that the MoD's then chief scientific advisor argued that the variant selection should be delayed in order that progress in the SDD programme could give greater confidence in the relative cost and performance of the STOVL and CV versions.

 

JSF/JCA Delays

In early 2004 Lockheed Martin announced, and the DOD approved, an approximately a one year slippage in F-35 JSF programme plan, among other things this delays the Initial Operational Capability of the technically challenging STOVL B variant with the USMC from the current 2010 to 2012.  The UK MOD was given the choice of still retaining its planned timescale with a target 2012 Initial Operational Capability, but receive the less capable F-35B Block 2 variant for early deliveries (thus enabling training to commence), or instead wait an two years and receive the Block 3 aircraft that it wants. 

The F-35 Block 2 will be able to carry JDAM bombs and other precision air-to-ground  weapons for interdiction and close air support missions, and the AIM-120 AMRAAM, but will lack most of the rest of the intended air-to-air arsenal including the AIM-9X Sidewinder and the AIM-132 ASRAAM that the UK will use.  It's hoped that Block 2 aircraft can be easily upgraded to Block3 standard with only software changes and weapons integration tests.  

In February 2005  the government announced a two year delay to the JCA project.  Lord Bach stating "The joint combat aircraft (JCA) ISD noted for planning purposes in the initial tailored main gate, was December 2012. The "tailored" main gate was an interim approval point for the system development and demonstration phase of the programme. Subsequently the schedule for introducing this aircraft into service has been extensively reviewed in the light of the time taken in the United States to resolve the well known weight growth problems incurred by the STOVL variant of the JSF aircraft. Planning assumptions are now based on a revised ISD of December 2014. A firm decision on the ISD does not have to be made before the UK purchases significant numbers of aircraft. Our first planned purchase is December 2008 and by this time, with aircraft design frozen and initial development flights complete, the JCA programme will have increased maturity to make informed decisions on in-service dates."  Its subsequently been stated that allowing for pilot training, aircraft and squadron work up, including flight trials with the new carrier the MOD expects to achieve In Service in December 2014.

This decision was expected as the CVF carriers were at least two years behind schedule, and the MOD was reluctant to lead bringing the F-35B service with all its potential problems, rather than have the benefit of the USMC's trail blazing. 

SDR indicated that would be a combined RN/RAF FCBA buy of up to 150 aircraft - rather than separate buys of 60+90 aircraft to replace the Sea Harrier and Harrier respectively.   This latter became an RAF JCA buy of up to 150 aircraft as it was decided that the RAF would actually "own" all the aircraft at a cost of about £7 billion. 

In April 2003 UK press reports said that the order was likely to be cut to 110, and in February 2004 the American magazine Aviation Week suggested that as few as 80-85 JSF's might be bought by the UK - which would require a cut in planned force levels.  In June 2006, official (US) JSF program sources stated that the UK was expected to commit to buying 138 JSF's.

The RN remained determined that its new carriers would still be able to operate three full 12 aircraft JCA squadrons, despite intense pressure to reduce the carriers size and cost significantly on the basis that there is no point in having large carriers often with empty hangers and flight decks.

 

---

 

Part 2 of this article...
<< 1  2  >>

 

Back to top